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Abstract. We investigate traffic routing both from the perspective of real world data as well as theory.
First, we reveal through data analytics a natural but previously uncaptured regularity of real world routing
behavior. Agents only consider, in their strategy sets, paths whose free-flow costs (informally their lengths)
are within a small multiplicative (1 + θ) constant of the optimal free-flow cost path connecting their
source and destination where θ ≥ 0. In the case of Singapore, θ = 1 is a good estimate of agents’ route
(pre)selection mechanism. In contrast, in Pigou networks the ratio of the free-flow costs of the routes
and thus θ is infinite, so although such worst case networks are mathematically simple they correspond
to artificial routing scenarios with little resemblance to real world conditions, opening the possibility of
proving much stronger Price of Anarchy guarantees by explicitly studying their dependency on θ. We
provide an exhaustive analysis of this question by providing provably tight bounds on PoA(θ) for arbitrary
classes of cost functions both in the case of general congestion/routing games as well as in the special case
of path-disjoint networks. For example, in the case of the standard Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) cost
model, ce(x) = aex
4 + be and more generally quartic cost functions, the standard PoA bound for θ =∞ is
2.1505 [23] and it is tight both for general networks as well as path-disjoint and even parallel-edge networks.
In comparison, in the case of θ = 1, the PoA in the case of general networks is only 1.6994, whereas for
path-disjoint/parallel-edge networks is even smaller (1.3652), showing that both the route geometries as
captured by the parameter θ as well as the network topology have significant effects on PoA (Figure 1).
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(a) Comparison between PoA(θ) in the case of quar-
tic costs for general/path-disjoint networks resp.
and the standard bound PoA(∞)=2.1505 from [23].
More results can be found in Table 1.
(b) Shortest free-flow path versus chosen
path. Discussion on data analytics can be
found in Section 2.
Fig. 1: Improved Price of Anarchy bounds in data-driven routing models
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1 Introduction
Modern cities are wonders of emergent, largely self-organizing, behavior. Major capitals buzz with the collective
hum of millions of people whose lives are intertwined and coupled in myriad and diverse ways. One of the most
palpable such phenomena of collective behavior is the emergence and diffusion of traffic throughout the city.
A bird’s eye view of any major city would reveal a complex and heterogeneous landscape of thousands upon
thousands of cars, buses, trucks, motorcycles, running though the veins of a maze of remarkable complexity
and scale consisting of a vast number of streets and highways. As Figure 2 suggests, the full magnitude of the
multi-scale complexity of these real-life networks lies outside the perceptive capabilities of any single individual.
Nevertheless, as a phenomenon that we get to experience daily, such as the weather, we would like to understand
at least some macroscopic, high level characteristics of traffic routing. Quite possibly, one of the most interesting
such questions is how efficient is a traffic network?
This question has received a lot of attention within algorithmic game theory. Using the model of congestion
games, seminal papers in the area established tight bounds on their Price of Anarchy (PoA), i.e., the worst case
inefficiency of traffic routing [15, 25]. For example, the Price of Anarchy of linear non-atomic congestion games
is 4/3, whereas if we apply the standard Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) cost functions that are polynomials of
degree four, then the Price of Anarchy is roughly 2.151. On the positive side, these bounds apply to all networks
(within the prescribed class of delay/cost functions) regardless of their size or their total demand, or number of
agents and are tight even for the simplest possible network instances, i.e., Pigou networks with just two parallel
links.
The common interpretation of these bounds is that they are strong and a PoA anywhere in that range
(e.g. PoA=2) immediately translates to practical guarantees about real traffic. Some recent purely experimental
work, however, has produced new insights that allow us to reexamine these results from a different perspective.
For example, [18] showed that the efficiency of real-life traffic networks, as estimated from traffic measurements
alone, is really close to optimal even when compared to very optimistic estimates of optimal performance. A
Price of Anarchy of 2 implies that the average commuter can increase their mean speed by 100%. Measurements
suggest that this level of inefficiencies/improvements is rather unlikely. Since Price of Anarchy is a macroscopic
characteristic of a system with countless moving parts, a more useful analogy is that of weather or climate (e.g.,
average temperature). The differences between 10% and 20% increase to system inefficiency are significant and
a 100% increase, i.e., PoA of 2 would have catastrophic consequences.
A natural question emerges: Can we create classes of models, i.e., congestion games, which come closer to
representing real world traffic? In this paper we do, by leveraging an intuitive but largely unexplored character-
istic of real world traffic routing. Commuters only consider in their strategy sets paths/routes whose free-flow
costs (informally their lengths) are approximately equal to each other (within a multiplicative factor of 1 + θ).
We call such games θ-free flow games. We generalize the special case of linear congestion θ-free flow games [3]
to the case of arbitrary classes of cost functions as well as simultaneously studying both general networks as
well as path-disjoint networks. θ = 0 means that all paths considered by each user have exactly equal free-flow
cost/length, whereas θ = 1 allows for paths whose lengths are within a factor of 2. Pigou networks may feel
intuitively very simple and thus natural due to their small size, but they fail to satisfy this property in the most
extreme sense. The ratio of the free-flow costs of the two edges is infinite (θ = ∞). It is like considering two
possible paths from home to work, one which is the shortest distance route and one that circumnavigates the
globe along the way. Such unnatural paths may indeed be available to us, but we unconsciously and automati-
cally prune them out from the set of alternatives that we consider. Amazingly, enforcing such a natural property
on the set of models (routing games) we consider immediately removes from consideration Pigou networks, the
worst case examples from a PoA perspective, and thus opens up the possibility of proving stronger Price of
Anarchy guarantees. What are the implications of such characteristics to PoA? What other type of attributes
can we take advantage of when creating new models? Finally, how well do they match real traffic conditions?
1.1 Our Contribution
In Section 2, we start off by experimentally computing estimates of θ from real world traffic data. We employ
an experimental dataset that contains detailed information (sampled every 13 seconds) on the routing behavior
of tens of thousands of commuters in Singapore. Based on this fine-grained information and in combination
with a graph representation of the road network of Singapore that we have created we can estimate numerous
characteristics of the actual routing behavior at an unprecedented level of accuracy. Using these tools that we
believe are of independent interest as well, we find that the θ values for the vast majority of commuters (close
to 80%) are below 1.
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Fig. 2: For each trip segment, we find the best free-flow time and the data free-flow time. The reconstruction
of the selected route uses datapoints logged along the trip. In yellow, the fastest route in free-flow condition is
highlighted. The reconstructed route is in green, along which we find the data free-flow time.
Inspired by the above evidence, we introduce a new class of congestion games, that we call free-flow games,
parametrized by θ (Section 3). Building on the primal-dual method introduced in [1], we provide two para-
metric tight bounds on the Price of Anarchy of free-flow games under general latency functions satisfying mild
assumptions, thus largely extending the results given in [3] which are restricted to affine latencies only. The
first of these bounds applies to the general case of unrestricted network topologies (indeed, it applies even
to congestion games) (Theorem 1), while the second one holds for path-disjoint networks (Theorem 2) which
includes the fundamental parallel-links topology. These bounds are never equal as long as θ /∈ {0,∞}. In fact,
differently from what happens in the classical setting without the free-flow assumption, where the worst-case
situation already arises in a two parallel-links network (the Pigou network), for free-flow games the absence of
intersections among paths allows for more efficient equilibria. More precisely, as θ goes to infinity, both bounds
converge to the same limit, but the convergence of the one for parallel-link networks can be significantly slower
(see, for instance, Figure 1(a)). We also stress that, with respect to the case of affine latency functions, our
findings improve on the results given in [3], as we close the gap between upper and lower bound on the Price of
Anarchy for parallel-link networks that was left as an open problem.
One of the most important messages coming from our investigation is that the separation outlined by
Theorems 1 and 2 sheds new light on the question of whether the Price of Anarchy is affected by the network
topology. In fact, a famous, and perhaps counter-intuitive, result by Roughgarden [23] states that the PoA is
independent of the network topology as, in almost all notable cases, worst-case instances are already attained by
simple networks, such as parallel-link graphs. Under the free-flow assumption, however, this situation ceases to
hold, and the network topology begins to play a critical, if not dominant, role in the efficiency of equilibria. This
evidence has major practical implications, as it signifies the fundamental importance of careful road network
design and planning for selfish routing. As shown in Figure 1 and in more details in Table 1, in the case of
the standard Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) cost model, ce(x) = aex
4 + be and more generally quartic cost
functions, applying the constraint θ = 1 nearly halves the percentage of inefficiency, and applying the additional
constraint of a path-disjoint network halves it once again.
At the technical level, our general formulas depend on whether the free-flow traversing time of some edges
is larger than zero, i.e., whether the limit of the edge cost/latency as its load goes to zero is strictly positive.
Latency functions for which this does not hold have been termed homogeneous by Roughgarden [23] and they
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represent one of the few exceptions for which he could not prove that the PoA is independent of the network
topology. Since under homogeneous latency functions any congestion game is a 0-free flow game, as a by-
product of our results, we also obtain that, for (free-flow) games with homogeneous latency functions, the Price
of Anarchy is lower than the one attained by non-homogeneous latencies, and it is tight even for parallel-links
topologies (Theorem 2), thus answering the open question posed by Roughgarden in [23].
To summarize, we obtain that the Price of Anarchy is independent of the network topology (i.e., the worst-
case PoA is attained by parallel-link games) if and only if one of the following cases occurs: (i) θ = 0 (which
include the case of homogeneous latency functions as a special case) and (ii) θ =∞.
For the sake of a more concrete exposition of our results and for empirical purposes, we provide explicitly
an instantiation of the PoA bounds in the case of polynomial latency functions (Theorems 3 and 4). The
resulting bounds depend on both the maximum and minimum degree of the polynomials and, in the case
of non-homogeneous polynomials only, they also depend on θ. A quantitative representation of our results is
partially summarized in Table 1.
(p, q)
θ = 0 θ = 1/2 θ = 1 θ =∞
General Path-disjoint General Path-disjoint General Path-disjoint General Path-disjoint
(1, 1) 1 [3] 1 1.1547 [3] 1.0909 1.2071 [3] 1.1429 1.3333 [25] 1.3333 [25]
(2, 1) 1.0355 1.0355 1.2873 1.1472 1.3852 1.2383 1.6258 [23] 1.6258 [23]
(2, 2) 1 1 1.2873 1.1472 1.3852 1.2383 1.6258 [23] 1.6258 [23]
(3, 1) 1.0982 1.0982 1.4078 1.1869 1.5475 1.3093 1.8956 [23] 1.8956 [23]
(3, 2) 1.0147 1.0147 1.4078 1.1869 1.5475 1.3093 1.8956 [23] 1.8956 [23]
(3, 3) 1 1 1.4078 1.1869 1.5475 1.3093 1.8956 [23] 1.8956 [23]
(4, 1) 1.1676 1.1676 1.5202 1.2170 1.6994 1.3652 2.1505 [23] 2.1505 [23]
(4, 2) 1.0450 1.0450 1.5202 1.2170 1.6994 1.3652 2.1505 [23] 2.1505 [23]
(4, 3) 1.0080 1.0080 1.5202 1.2170 1.6994 1.3652 2.1505 [23] 2.1505 [23]
(4, 4) 1 1 1.5202 1.2170 1.6994 1.3652 2.1505 [23] 2.1505 [23]
Table 1: The Price of Anarchy of free-flow games with non-homogeneous (i.e., with constant terms allowed)
polynomial latency functions of maximum degree p ≤ 4 and minimum degree q. Unlabelled bounds are proven
in this paper. Bounds for homogeneous (i.e., without constant terms) polynomials can be obtained from the
case θ = 0 (the same upper bounds have been given in [10], but tight lower bounds were only conjectured to
exist). As it can be appreciated, the PoA depends on the network topology whenever 0 < θ <∞.
1.2 Related Work
Price of anarchy in routing games: Introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [15], the ratio between the
social cost of the worst equilibrium of a game and its optimum was given the name Price of Anarchy (PoA)
in [22]. For networks of linear latency and general topology, PoA was bounded tightly by 4/3 [25] and 5/2 in
the atomic case [6]. Following results by Roughgarden [24] studied more general latency functions and atomic
routing games and again gave tight bounds on PoA. However, for a large class of natural latency functions, PoA
tends to 1 as the demand on the network approaches infinitesimally small or infinitely high levels [7, 8]. This
casts doubts on the predictive power of PoA on the state of a real system, as noted in Monnot et al. [18].
Strategy sets of routing games are typically exponential in the number of vertices, hence restricting them
is a common assumption. The unnatural character of Pigou in real systems was noted by Lu and Yu [17], who
assume players have at least one strategy that is not more than λ away from the fastest strategy in congestion
games. Restricting the strategy sets to obtain tighter bounds for PoA is also employed in [2, 5] for load balancing
games (i.e., congestion games where the strategies of players are singleton sets). Fotakis [11] proved a pure PoA
bound for symmetric atomic congestion games on extension-parallel networks, an interesting class of networks
with linearly independent paths, that is equal to that of non-atomic congestion games.
Primal-dual techniques for bounding the Price of Anarchy in non-cooperative games have been proposed by
Bil [1], Kulkarni and Mirrokni [16], Nadav and Roughgarden [20] and Thang [26]. The methods proposed in [1]
and [20] operate by explicitly formulating the problem of maximizing the Price of Anarchy of a class of games.
Despite using the same formulation, they differ in the choice of the variables. While [20] uses the probability
distributions defining the outcomes occurring in the formulation, [1] adopts suitable multipliers for the resource
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cost functions. The methods in [16] and [26], instead, build on a formulation for the problem of optimizing the
social function, and then implement the equilibria conditions within the choice of the dual variables. We adopt
the method proposed in [1] as it appears to be more flexible and powerful in our realm of application. The first
advantage is that it generalizes to any type of cost functions, while all the others require some restrictions: the
method in [20] can only be applied to affine functions, the one in [16] requires convex functions, while that of
[26] needs non-decreasing ones. Secondly, the method (if properly used) always yields tight bounds on the Price
of Anarchy, while those in [16] and [26] are limited by the integrality gap of the formulation. Last but not least,
it models in a simple, direct and intuitive way any new twist, as the free-flow property considered in this work,
one may want to add to the scenario of application.
Transportation research: The seminal work of Wardrop [28] introduces and formalizes one of the first notions
of equilibrium in transportation networks. A proof of the equal social costs for equilibria and optimum (i.e.,
PoA = 1) in parallel links routing games appears in Nagurney and Qiang [21]. Related ideas from sensitivity
analysis for edge cost functions are treated in Tobin and Friesz [27]. The Price of Anarchy was estimated for
the city of Boston with different means from our study by Zhang et al. [30], where the sensitivity of the social
cost at equilibrium with respect to edge parameters is also discussed. The previously cited works rely on the
BPR estimation of cost functions [4], which are included in the family of weakly monomial latency functions
we define in Section 3. The free-flow property in transportation networks has been first proposed by Jahn et al.
[14] with respect to the problem of optimizing a centralized traffic flow without imposing too longer detours to
some users.
2 Experimental Evidence for θ-Free-Flow Time in Singapore
We look for experimental evidence that commuters use the heuristic presented in the introduction to guide their
routing decisions. Namely, we make the conjecture that commuters consider only paths with “length” at most
a mutliplicative factor 1 + θ away from the shortest path taking them to their destination (where “length” is
measured as a latency, or travel time). Does this conjecture hold in practice?
To answer, we must obtain data on the routing behavior of a sampled population. Knowing the route taken
by individuals in the sample, we must be able to infer what their travel time would have been in free-flow
road conditions, i.e., without anyone else on the road (the data free-flow time). Finally, we must compute the
shortest free-flow travel time on any path connecting their origin to their destination (the best free-flow time).
By comparing data and best free-flow time for each individual in the sample, we arrive at a distribution of θ
over our set of trips.5
In this section, we make use of the Singapore National Science Experiment dataset to understand the
routing behavior of its participants. First, we introduce the dataset and our data processing methods. Second,
we provide the methodology for estimating the data free-flow trip duration of the subjects’ chosen morning route,
computed from the collected data. Third, we compare this measure with the best free-flow time, optimized over
all commuting paths.
2.1 The National Science Experiment
As part of the Smart Nation programme, the National Science Experiment (NSE) is a nationwide project
in Singapore in which over 90,000 students from primary, secondary and junior college wore a sensor, called
SENSg, for up to one week per student in 2015 and 2016. The SENSg sensors collect ambient temperature,
relative humidity, atmospheric pressure, light intensity, sound pressure level, and 9-degree of freedom motion
data. The NSE initiative led up to the mass-production of 50,000 sensor nodes. The SENSg scans the Wi-Fi
hotspots which are used to localize the sensor nodes as well as to move sensor data to a back-end server. All
environment and motion values are sampled every 13 seconds using the Wi-Fi based localization system. The
raw collected datapoints are then post-processed to obtain semantic data, employing state-of-the-art methods
described in [18, 19, 29] and employed to study the relationship between efficiency and inequality in [12]. The
semantic data covers the identification of individual trips within the discrete stream of locations, inference of
the activity performed at each endpoint and transportation mode classification.
The NSE 2016 dataset contains data from 49,526 students who wore the SENSg sensor. This work uses
the mode identification algorithm developed in [31] where five different modes can be identified, namely: (a)
stationary; (b) walking; (c) riding a train; (d) riding a bus; and (e) riding a car. With additional information
5 Modelling assumptions and a formal definition of θ are presented in Section 3.
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from Singapore’s Land Transportation Authority, the algorithm detection covers 8 rail lines, 106 train stations,
260 bus services and 4,684 bus stops. Similarly, the 164 km of expressways and the 698 km of arterial roads in
Singapore feed the algorithm to distinguish whether a subject is traveling in a car.
To ensure the quality of our empirical results, we perform a strict data cleaning process over the complete
dataset. A total of 34,121 clean trips are considered, with 16,563 unique students and 89 different schools. This
work focuses on morning travels of students who get to their schools from their homes. Two main reasons were
considered for this choice.
First, in the following analyses, the latency, or duration of the trip, is considered as the primary “cost” of the
subjects, discounting any other monetary cost. Morning trips typically feature subjects optimizing to minimize
their latency. Evening trips are more sparse since the battery of sensor is expected to be charged at night while
the subject is home. By the end of the day, if it has run out due to not being charged properly, the evening trip
is not recorded. We have however in the dataset 21,065 samples for which both morning and evening trips are
recorded. For these pairs, the average duration of the morning trip is 29 minutes and 6 seconds, while it is 33
minutes and 33 seconds for the evening trip.
Second, the data source—students of Singapore—may not constitute a fully representative sample of Singa-
pore’s population. However, their exposure to traffic during the morning hours—which are effectively the most
congested conditions—allows us to infer properties of the system as a whole. The geographical distribution of
their homes broadly correspond to the population density of Singapore, and thus provides additional confi-
dence on the representativeness. Additionally, the number of students by school type is approximately equally
distributed, hence capturing the routing behavior of subjects over a large space in Singapore.
Our dataset contains highly granular information concerning the routing decisions of the subjects. With the
help of the onboard sensors in the device and the mode identification algorithm, we are able to obtain for each
trip an accurate representation of its segments and their endpoints. For instance, typical segments making up a
trip may be “Walk - Car - Walk”, or “Walk - Bus - Train - Bus - Walk”. The following study focuses on car trip
segments. In this dataset [18], looking at the population of public transport users only, Price of Anarchy was
upper bounded by 1.18. Converserly, Price of Anarchy for car users only was bounded by 1.86. Putting both
populations together, Price of Anarchy was bounded by 1.34.
2.2 Estimation of Free-Flow Time for Selected Route
We compute a graph representation from a road map of Singapore, where each vertex is located at an intersection
or a bend in the road. An edge connecting two vertices indicates the presence of a segment of road going from
one vertex to the other. Edges also possess additional metadata: their physical length (in meters) as well as the
road type—such as expressway, local street, arterial road, and so on.
Every edge is assigned with a cost representing how much time is needed to traverse it. This latency is
obtained from edge features such as the road type and the posted speed limit on the road. For each private
transportation trip segment in the dataset, we associate its origin and destination with the closest vertex in the
graph. We run a shortest path algorithm to estimate the free-flow travel time of the trip segment, referred to
in the following as the best free-flow time. This best free-flow time is compared with the data free-flow time, or
the time it would take the subject to travel the same trip segment if no one was on the road. We describe how
the data free-flow time is estimated in the following paragraph.
A segment measured by the sensor consists of a stream of geographical locations. For each datapoint, we
associate the closest edge in the graph. The size of the graph (61,151 vertices and 65,596 edges) implies a lengthy
lookup phase to associate the point to its closest edge. For this reason, we consider a smaller dataset of 449 car
segments out of the 17,897 segments in the larger dataset. These selected segments are well distributed across
Singapore as depicted by Figure 2.
The direction in which the subject traversed the edge is assigned by a heuristic based on the distance of
each endpoint to the endpoints of edges preceding and following the edge under consideration. In other words,
the heuristic attempts to minimize the amount of back and forth, selecting the direction that least creates
deviations.
Information on the origin and destination of the trip as well as the list of directed edges traversed by the
subject does not suffice. Where the sensor does not record a datapoint,6 we must provide a best guess on which
edges were crossed during the trip.
6 Geographical location is obtained by scanning surrounding WiFi access points. The method does not always yield
accurate enough measurements, but the issue can be mitigated with proper data processing [19].
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– For gaps of small length between two directed edges e1 and e2 (in that order), we compute the average
speed between the two edges and drive a straight line between the target of e1 and the source of e2. The
duration to cross this gap is obtained as the geographical distance divided by the average speed.
– For gaps of larger length, we run a shortest path algorithm between the target of e1 and the source of e2.
The data free-flow time is finally obtained as the sum of durations of redirected edges, small gaps and large
gaps.
2.3 Deviation and Estimate of θ
For each trip segment, two estimates are obtained: the best free-flow time and the data free-flow time. We
call deviation the ratio between these two estimates. The deviation is strongly related to the parameter θ
we introduce in Section 1. It measures the free-flow time difference between the best route the subject could
have chosen and the route actually selected, both in a situation of no congestion. The distribution of the
deviation among subjects provides a clue to estimating θ for the routing game of Singapore. A small value of
θ yields support to the hypothesis that agents only consider routes which connect origin and destination in a
straightforward manner (under no congestion) as part of their strategy set, see Figure 3.
0
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0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Quantile
   
   
   
  θ
Quartile 25% 50% 75% 100%
θ 0.17 0.45 0.88 3.53
Quartiles of θ
Fig. 3: The deviation is measured by the ratio of the selected route free-flow time to the minimum free-flow time
among all routes between the origin and the destination. Close to 80% of the θ values are below 1, implying
that the free-flow time of the selected route is rarely twice as long as the best free-flow time.
This experimental result provides justification for the upper bound of PoA estimated from the same dataset
in previous work [18]. This benchmark is meaningful for real road networks, as latency functions are typically
estimated using affine quartic monomials [4]. As noted in our introduction as well as in more details in the
next section, our model is based on the assumption of a uniform θ bound over the whole population. We
should note that this assumption is consistent with our experimental measurements, since these measurements
provide us with estimates on the lower bounds of the agents’ θ’s. More detailed models with a heterogeneous
population/distribution of θ’s is an interesting direction for future work.
3 Model and Definitions
For a positive integer i, let [i] := {1, 2, . . . , i}. Given a set A and a set B ⊇ A, let χA : B → {0, 1} denote the
indicator function, i.e., χA(x) = 1 if x ∈ A and χA(x) = 0 if x /∈ A. Given a tuple of numbers (α1, α2, . . . , αk),
we write (α1, α2, . . . , αk) > 0 if αi ≥ 0 for any i ∈ [k] and αi > 0 for some i ∈ [k].
Non-atomic Congestion Games. A non-atomic congestion game (from now on, simply a congestion game)
is a tuple CG =
(
[n], (ri)i∈[n], E, (`e)e∈E , (Σi)i∈[n]
)
, where [n] is a set of types, E is a set of resources, `e : R>0 →
R>0 is the latency function of resource e ∈ E, and, for each i ∈ [n], ri ∈ R≥0 is the amount of players of type i
and Σi ⊆ 2E \ ∅ is the set of strategies for players of type i (i.e. a strategy is a non-empty subset of resources).
We assume that latency functions are non-decreasing, positive, and continuous7.
7 The property of continuity is well-motivated by most of the real-life scenarios modelled by non-atomic congestion
games. Anyway, our theoretical results hold even with the weaker assumption of right-continuity.
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Classes of Congestion Games. A network congestion game is a congestion game based on a graphG = (V,E),
where the set of resources coincides with E, each type i is associated with a pair of nodes (ui, vi) ∈ V × V , so
that the set of strategies of players of type i is the set of paths from ui to vi in graph G. If there exists u
∗ ∈ V
such that u∗ = ui for any i ∈ [n], the game is called single-source network congestion game. Let P be the set of
all the paths P connecting source ui with destination vi, for any pair source-destination (ui, vi). The game is
called path-disjoint network congestion game if all the paths in P are pair-wise node-disjoint.
A load balancing game is a congestion game in which each strategy is a singleton, i.e., S = {e} for some e ∈ E,
for any strategy S ∈ Σi and type i ∈ [n]. A parallel-link game (or symmetric load balancing game) is a load
balancing game in which all players have the same set of strategies. It is well-known that each load balancing
game (resp. parallel-link game) can be modelled as a single-source congestion game (resp. path-disjoint network
congestion game).
Latency Functions. For the sake of simplicity, we extend the domain of each latency function `(x) to x = 0
in such a way that `(0) = limx→0+ `(x). Given a class of latency functions F , let [F ]H := {f : f(x) =
g(x) − g(0), g ∈ F}. Observe that f(0) = 0 for any f ∈ [F ]H by definition. In the following, we use similar
definitions as in [23]. F is homogeneous if F = [F ]H . F is weakly diverse if [F ]H ⊆ F and it contains at least
one constant function (i.e., a function f such that f(x) = β for any x > 0, for some β > 0). F is scale-closed if
it contains all the functions f such that f(x) = αg(x), for any g ∈ F and α > 0. F is strongly diverse if contains
all the functions f such that f(x) = αg(x) + β, for any g ∈ [F ]H and (α, β) > 0.
A polynomial latency function of maximum degree p and minimum degree q (with p ≥ q ≥ 1) is defined
as `e(x) :=
∑p
d=q αe,dx
d + βe, where (αe,q, αe,q+1, . . . , αe,p, βe) > 0. Let Pp,q denote the class of polynomial
latency functions of maximum degree p and minimum (non-zero) degree q. A weakly monomial latency function
of degree p is defined as `e(x) := αe,px
p + βe, with αe > 0, and βe ≥ 0. In the previous definition, `e is called
monomial latency function of degree p if βe = 0. Let WMp (resp. Mp) denote the class of of weakly monomial
latency functions (resp. monomial latency functions). Observe that Mp ⊂ WMp = Pp,p for any integer p ≥ 1.
A latency function `e is affine if `e ∈ WM1, and it is linear if `e ∈M1.
Strategy Profiles and Pure Nash Equilibria. A strategy profile is a tuple σ := (σi,S)i∈[n],S∈Σi with∑
S∈Σi σi,S = ri for any i ∈ [n], that is a state of the game where σi,S ≥ 0 is the total amount of players of
type i selecting strategy S for any i ∈ [n] and S ∈ Σi. Given a strategy profile σ, ke(σ) :=
∑
i∈[n],S∈Σi:e∈S σi,S
is the congestion of e in σ, i.e., the total amount of players selecting e in σ, and given a strategy S, cS(σ) :=∑
e∈S `e(ke(σ)) is the cost of players selecting S in σ. A strategy profile σ is a pure Nash equilibrium (or
Wardrop equilibrium, or equilibrium flow) if and only if, for each i ∈ [n], S ∈ Σi : σi,S > 0 and S′ ∈ Σi, it holds
that cS(σ) ≤ cS′(σ).
Quality of Equilibria. A social function that is usually used as a measure of the quality of a strategy
profile in congestion games is the total latency, defined as SUM(σ) :=
∑
e∈E ke(σ)`e(ke(σ)) =
∑
i∈[n] rici(σ) at
equilibrium σ. A social optimum is a strategy profile σ∗ minimizing SUM.
The Price of Anarchy of a congestion game CG (with respect to the social function SUM), denoted as
PoA(CG), is the supremum of the ratio SUM(σ)/SUM(σ∗), where σ is a pure Nash equilibrium for CG and σ∗ is
a social optimum for CG. As shown in [25], all pure Nash equilibria of any congestion game have the same total
latency. Thus, the Price of Anarchy can be redefined as the ratio SUM(σ)/SUM(σ∗), where σ is an arbitrary
pure Nash equilibrium for CG and σ∗ is a social optimum for CG.
Free-Flow Congestion Games Given θ ∈ [0,∞], a θ-free-flow congestion game CGθ is a congestion game in
which, for each i ∈ [n] and S, S′ ∈ Σi, it holds that
∑
e∈S `e(0) ≤ (1 + θ)
∑
e∈S′ `e(0), i.e., all the strategies
available to players of type i, when evaluated in absence of congestion, are within a factor 1 + θ one from the
other. Observe that free-flow congestion games are congestion games obeying some special properties. Thus,
all positive results holding for congestion games carries over to θ-free-flow congestion games for any value of θ.
Moreover, for θ =∞, any congestion game is a θ-free-flow congestion game.
4 Price of Anarchy of Free-Flow Congestion Games
In this section, we give tight bounds on the Price of Anarchy of free-flow congestion games. Before going into
details, we sketch the high level building blocks of the proofs of the upper bounds.
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For the general case, by adapting [1], we formulate the problem of bounding the Price of Anarchy of θ-free-
flow congestion games by means of a factor-revealing pair of primal-dual linear programs. The techniques work
as follows.
Given a θ-free-flow congestion game CGθ and a family of latency functions F , we know that we can model
the latency of every resource e ∈ E as `e(x) = αefe(x) + βe, with fe ∈ [F ]H , αe ∈ {0, 1} and βe ≥ 0. We fix a
Nash equilibrium σ and a social optimum σ∗ for CGθ. Hence, for every e ∈ E, the congestions ke(σ) and ke(σ∗)
of e in σ and σ∗, respectively, become fixed constants. As the Price of Anarchy measures the worst-case ratio
of SUM(σ) over SUM(σ∗), our goal becomes that of choosing suitable values for αe and βe, for every e ∈ E,
so as to maximize SUM(σ) under the assumption that SUM(σ∗) = 1, σ is a Nash equilibrium and CGθ is a
θ-free-flow game. In particular, constraint SUM(σ∗) = 1 can be assumed without loss of generality by a simple
scaling argument, provided we relax the condition αe ∈ {0, 1} with αe ≥ 0. Thus, an optimal solution to the
resulting linear program, call it LP, provides an upper bound to the Price of Anarchy of CGθ.
Next step is to compute and analyze the dual of LP, that we call DLP. DLP has three variables, namely
x, y and γ, with x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0 and γ defining its objective value. Thus, by the Weak Duality Theorem, any
feasible solution (x∗, y∗, γ∗) for DLP yields an upper bound of γ∗ to the optimal solution of LP and so an
upper bound to the Price of Anarchy of CGθ. For each function fe ∈ FH , DLP has two constraints, namely
c1(fe, ke(σ), ke(σ
∗), x, γ) and c2(fe, ke(σ), ke(σ∗), y, γ), providing lower bounds on γ. Thus, the hard work
becomes that of determining an optimal dual solution, i.e., a triple (x∗, y∗, γ∗) satisfying both constraints and
minimizing the value of γ∗. In fact, the lower is the value of γ∗, the more accurate becomes the estimation
of the Price of Anarchy. As we shall determine a feasible solution that is independent of the values of ke(σ)
and ke(σ
∗), the final derived upper bound is independent of the particular choice of both σ and σ∗ and, by
the arbitrariness of CGθ, we get an upper bound on the Price of Anarchy of θ-free-flow congestion games with
latency functions in F .
By analyzing the structure of the dual constraints and by the arbitrariness of ke(σ) and ke(σ
∗), it is
possible to show that, for any fixed function fe, γ is minimized for y =
x−1
1+θ and x ≥ 1. After applying these
simplifications, we finally obtain two significant lower bounds for γ, where we can assume without loss of
generality that ke(σ
∗) > 0. Both bounds depend on a structural property of fe; moreover, the first is also
influenced by the choice of x, while the second exhibits a dependence from θ. For any class of latency functions
G, by using k and l as a shorthand for ke(σ) and ke(σ∗), respectively, these bounds are denoted as γ(G) and
γθ(G), with
γ(G) := inf
x≥1
sup
l>0,f∈G
(
k + x(−k + l)
l
)
f(k)
f(l)
and γθ(G) := sup
k>l>0,f∈G
f(k)(k(1 + θ)− l)
f(k)(k − l)(1 + θ) + lf(l)θ .
An important advantage of the primal-dual method is that, whenever LP provides a tight characterization
of the properties possessed by the games and the equilibria under analysis, an optimal solution to DLP can be
fruitfully exploited to construct, quite systematically, but not without effort, matching lower bounding instances.
We manage to achieve this result also in this case, but, given the very technical nature of the constructions, we
refer the interested reader to the appendix.
In the related literature, bounds on the Price of Anarchy are often obtained by exploiting Roughgarden’s
smoothness framework [24]. It is based on an inequality linking together the social value of an optimal solution
and the sum of the players’ costs at an equilibrium, thus requiring the use of two variables. However, for certain
settings, as the one considered in this work, additional structural properties of the game need to be embedded in
the model. This requires more sophisticated constraints involving a higher number of variables. The primal-dual
method handles these twists more easily, as it suffices writing down properly all the additional constraints that
need to be satisfied by the model (in our case, the free-flow property). Then, the final set of factor-revealing
inequalities that needs to be analyzed elegantly results as a consequence of the duality theory.
For the case of parallel-links and path-disjoint games, we apply a similar, although more direct approach. We
fix once again CGθ, the family of latency functions F , the latency of every resource e ∈ E, a Nash equilibrium σ
and a social optimum σ∗ for CGθ, so as to obtain constant values for both ke(σ) and ke(σ∗). This time, instead of
resorting to linear programming, we write down the parametric expression of the Price of Anarchy as a function
of ke(σ), ke(σ
∗) and the latency functions of the resources in the game. A key feature of this case, that makes it
different from the general setting analyzed before, is that, here, we need have
∑
e∈E ke(σ) =
∑
e∈E ke(σ
∗). By
exploiting this equality, together with the equilibrium conditions and the θ-free-flow property of CGθ, we create
a sequence of more and more relaxed upper bounds for the Price of Anarchy, until we end up to a sufficiently
simple formula. Also in this case, we can show that the performed analysis is tight by providing matching lower
bounding instances whose description is again deferred to the appendix.
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4.1 The Main Theorems
Theorem 1. Let CGθ be a θ-free-flow congestion game with latency functions in F and θ ∈ [0,∞]. We have
PoA(CGθ) ≤
γ([F ]H) if θ = 0,γ(F) if θ =∞,
max{γ([F ]H), γθ([F ]H)} if θ ∈ (0,∞).
This bound is tight for single-source network games if F is weakly diverse and even for load balancing games if
F is strongly diverse.
Proof. We first show the upper bound for θ ∈ [0,∞). Let σ = (σi,S)i∈[n],S∈Σi and σ∗ = (σ∗i,S)i∈[n],S∈Σi be a
pure Nash equilibrium and a social optimum for CGθ, respectively. Let ke := ke(σ) and le := ke(σ
∗) for any
e ∈ E. Let `e(x) := αefe(x) + βe be the latency function of each resource e ∈ E, with αe ∈ {0, 1}, βe ≥ 0, and
fe ∈ [F ]H . By applying the primal-dual method [1], we have that the optimal solution of the following linear
program in variables (αe)e∈E and (βe)e∈E is an upper bound on PoA(CGθ):
LP : max
∑
e∈E
(αekefe(ke) + βeke)
s.t.
∑
e∈E
(αekefe(ke) + βeke) ≤
∑
e∈E
(αelefe(ke) + βele) (1)∑
e∈E
βele ≤
∑
e∈E
(1 + θ)βeke (2)∑
e∈E
(αelefe(le) + βele) = 1 (3)
αe, βe ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E.
Indeed:
– Each latency function `e can be expressed as `e(ke) = αefe(ke) + βe with αe ∈ {0, 1}.
– For any i ∈ [n], and any two strategies S, S∗ ∈ Σi, let σi,S,S∗ ≥ 0 denote the amount of players of
type i selecting S in σ and selecting S∗ in σ∗. By the pure Nash equilibrium conditions, we have that∑
e∈S(αefe(ke) + βe) ≤
∑
e∈S∗(αefe(ke) + βe), for any i ∈ [n], and for any two strategies S, S∗ ∈ Σi such
that σi,S,S∗ > 0. Then, we have that
0 ≥
∑
i∈[n]
∑
S,S∗∈Σi
σi,S,S∗
(∑
e∈S
(αefe(ke) + βe)−
∑
e∈S∗
(αefe(ke) + βe)
)
=
∑
e∈E
 ∑
i∈[n],S,S∗∈Σi:e∈S
σi,S,S∗
 (αefe(ke) + βe)−∑
e∈E
 ∑
i∈[n],S,S∗∈Σi:e∈S∗
σi,S,S∗
 (αefe(ke) + βe)
=
∑
e∈E
(αekefe(ke) + βeke)−
∑
e∈E
(αelefe(ke) + βele),
and this implies constraint (1).
– By using the definition of θ-free-flow congestion games, we have that
∑
e∈S∗ βe ≤ (1 + θ)
∑
e∈S βe, for any
i ∈ [n], and for any strategies S, S∗ ∈ Σi such that σi,S,S∗ > 0. Thus
0 ≥
∑
i∈[n]
∑
S,S∗∈Σi
σi,S,S∗
(∑
e∈S∗
βe − (1 + θ)
∑
e∈S
βe
)
=
∑
e∈E
 ∑
i∈[n],S,S∗∈Σi:e∈S∗
σi,S,S∗
βe − (1 + θ)∑
e∈E
 ∑
i∈[n],S,S∗∈Σi:e∈S
σi,S,S∗
βe
=
∑
e∈E
leβe −
∑
e∈E
(1 + θ)keβe,
and this implies constraint (2).
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– The Price of Anarchy of CGθ is
SUM(σ)
SUM(σ∗) =
∑
e∈E(αekefe(ke)+βeke)∑
e∈E(αelefe(le)+βele)
, thus, by maximizing such value over all
the possible αe, βe ≥ 0 subject to constraints (1) and (2), we get an upper bound on the Price of Anarchy of
CGθ. If we restrict the values of αe and βe in such a way that the further normalization constraint (3) holds,
we do not affect the maximum value considered above, thus finding such maximum value is equivalent to
find the optimal solution of LP. This can be achieved by relaxing the condition αe ∈ {0, 1} to αe ≥ 0.
We call generating set a generic finite set S ⊆ {(k, l, f) : k, l ≥ 0, f ∈ [F ]H}. For any generating set S, we define
a linear program in variables γ, x, y:
DLP(S) min γ
s.t. lf(l)γ ≥ kf(k) + x(−kf(k) + lf(k)) ∀(k, l, f) ∈ S (4)
lγ ≥ k + x(−k + l) + y(−l + (1 + θ)k) ∀(k, l, f) ∈ S (5)
x, y ≥ 0,
Let SE := {(ke, le, fe) : e ∈ E}. Observe that DLP(SE) is the dual of LP. Indeed, each dual constraint of type
(4) (resp. (5)) is associated to some primal variable αe (resp. βe), and x (resp. y, resp. γ) is the dual variable
associated to the primal constraint defined in (1) (resp. (2), resp. (3)).
For any generating set S, let γ(S) denote the optimal value of DLP(S). By the Weak Duality Theorem, γ(S)
is at least equal to the optimal value of LP, that is an upper bound on PoA(CGθ). Thus, to show the claim it is
sufficient showing that γ(S) is upper bounded by max{γ([F ]H), γθ([F ]H)} for any generating set S.
Let S be an arbitrary generating set. We assume without loss of generality that S contains triples (k′, 0, f ′),
(0, 1, f ′) and (k′, 1, f ′) for some arbitrary f ′ ∈ [F ]H and some sufficiently large k′ (indeed, by adding new triples
the optimal γ cannot decrease). By exploiting constraint (5), we can set y := x−11+θ to get an optimal solution.
Indeed, constraint (5) can be rewritten as lγ ≥ (1 − x + (1 + θ)y)k + (x − y)l. Observe that the coefficient of
k in the previous inequality, i.e., term 1 − x + (1 + θ)y, must be non-positive, otherwise, we get an arbitrarily
large γ by considering a constraint of type (5) with a triple (k′, 1, f ′) having a sufficiently large k′. Thus, by
imposing 1− x+ (1 + θ)y ≤ 0, we have that the worst-case constraint of type (5) is obtained by triple (0, 1, f ′).
Since the coefficient of l becomes (x − y), the optimal value for γ is obtained by setting y as high as possible.
Since 1− x+ (1 + θ)y ≤ 0 is equivalent to y ≤ x−11+θ , it is sufficient setting y := x−11+θ .
Now, we can assume without loss of generality that any optimal solution of DLP(S) is such that x ≥ 1,
otherwise we get an arbitrarily large γ by considering a constraint of type (4) for triple (k′, 1, f ′) with a
sufficiently large k′. Furthermore, we can avoid constraints of type (4) with l = 0, as DLP(S) is always satisfied
for l = 0, considering that we have assumed x ≥ 1. We conclude that, by setting y := x−11+θ in DLP(S), we get
the following linear program which is equivalent to DLP(S):
DLP2(S) : min γ
s.t. γ ≥ kf(k) + x(−kf(k) + lf(k))
lf(l)
, ∀(k, l, f) ∈ S : l > 0 (6)
γ ≥ xθ + 1
1 + θ
(7)
x ≥ 1.
By constraint (7), we get that any feasible solution (γ, x) of DLP2(S) verifies γ ≥ 1, thus DLP2(S) admits an
optimal solution. Let (γ∗, x∗) be the optimal solution DLP2(S), chosen as extreme point of the feasible region of
DLP2(S). Thus (γ∗, x∗) verifies one of the following cases: (a) two constraints of type (6) are tight; (b) exactly
one constraint of type (6) and constraint (7) are tight. If case (a) holds, we conclude that
PoA(CGθ) ≤ γ∗ = max
(k,l,f)∈S:l>0
kf(k) + x∗(−kf(k) + lf(k))
lf(l)
≤ γ([F ]H). (8)
and the claim follows.
If case (b) holds, we have that there exists a triple (k, l, f) ∈ S such that a constraint of type (6) is satisfied,
and constraint (7) is satisfied. We have that k > l. Indeed, if any tight constraint of type (6) is associated to a
triple (k, l, f) with k ≤ l, the optimal value does not decrease if we reduce the value of x∗, and this contradicts
the fact that (γ∗, x∗) is an extreme point of the feasible region. Thus, there exist k, l > 0 with k > l > 0,
f ∈ [F ]H , and x ≥ 1, such that γ(S) = kf(k)+x(−kf(k)+lf(k))lf(l) and γ(S) = xθ+11+θ , that is, γ(S) = f(k)(k(1+θ)−l)f(k)(k−l)θ+lf(l)θ .
12 Francisco Benita, Vittorio Bilo`, Barnabe´ Monnot, Georgios Piliouras, and Cosimo Vinci
We conclude that
PoA(CGθ) ≤ γ(S) = f(k)(k(1 + θ)− l)
f(k)(k − l)(1 + θ) + lf(l)θ ≤ γθ([F ]H). (9)
As either (8) or (9) holds, we get PoA(CGθ) ≤ max{γ([F ]H), γθ([F ]H)}, and the claim follows. For the particular
case of θ = 0, as γ0([F ]H) = 1, we get PoA(CG0) ≤ γ([F ]H).
Now, we move to the case of θ =∞. Here, we assume that, for each resource e ∈ E, the latency function is
of the form `e(x) = αefe(x), with fe ∈ F . By using similar arguments as before, we derive a new linear program
LP, deprived of constraint (2) and of variables (βe)e∈E , whose optimal value is an upper bound to PoA(CGθ).
Then, the dual of LP is equal to DLP(S), but without constraint (7) and with fe ∈ F . Let (γ∗, x∗) be the optimal
solution of this dual program. As constraint (7) has been removed, we have that case (a) considered before is the
unique possible case that can occur. Thus, we get PoA(CGθ) ≤ γ∗ = max(k,l,f)∈S:l>0 kf(k)+x
∗(−kf(k)+lf(k))
lf(l) ≤
γ(F).
The construction of the matching lower bounding instances is deferred to the appendix. uunionsq
We now show that, when considering either parallel-links games or path-disjoint network congestion games,
a better bound on the Price of Anarchy can be achieved. To this aim, given a class of latency functions G, let
us define
ηθ(G) := sup
k>l>0,f∈G
kf(k)(1 + θ)
kf(k)(1 + θ) + (lf(l)− lf(k))θ .
Theorem 2. Fix a value θ ∈ [0,∞) and a class of latency functions F . Let PLGθ be a θ-free-flow path-disjoint
network congestion game with latency functions in F . Then, PoA(PLGθ) ≤ max{γ([F ]H), ηθ([F ]H)}. The bound
is tight in general and even for parallel-links networks if F is scale-closed.
Proof. Here, we show the claim for the restricted case θ-free-flow parallel-links games only. For the case of path-
disjoint network games, see the Appendix. Let PLGθ be a θ-free-flow parallel-link game with latency functions
in F . Let `e(x) := αefe(x) + βe be the latency function of each resource e ∈ E, with αe = {0, 1}, βe ≥ 0,
and fe ∈ [F ]H . Let σ and σ∗ be a pure Nash equilibrium and a social optimum for PLGθ, respectively. Let
ke := ke(σ) and le := ke(σ
∗) for any e ∈ E. Let E+ := {e ∈ E : ke > le} and E− := {e ∈ E : ke < le}. If one
set among E+ and E− is empty, then E+ = E− = ∅ necessarily, and we have that the Price of Anarchy of PLGθ
is 1. Then, as ηθ(F) ≥ 1, the claim holds. Thus, we assume that E+ 6= ∅ and then E− 6= ∅. Furthermore, we
assume without loss of generality that there are no resources e ∈ E such that ke = le, otherwise, by removing
these resources and their users from the game, the Price of Anarchy does not decrease. Observe that, for any
pair of resources u ∈ E+ and v ∈ E−, we can assign an amount of flow wu,v ∈ [0, 1] to pair (u, v) in such
a way that ku − lu =
∑
v∈E− wu,v and lv − kv =
∑
u∈E+ wu,v. For any two resources u ∈ E+ and v ∈ E−,
let ξu,v := wu,v/(ku − lu) and ψu,v := wu,v/(lv − kv). Observe that
∑
v∈E− ξu,v = 1 for any u ∈ E− and∑
u∈E+ ξu,v = 1 for any v ∈ E−. We have that
SUM(σ) =
∑
u∈E+
ku`u(ku) +
∑
v∈E−
kv`v(kv) =
∑
u∈E+
ku`u(ku)
∑
v∈E−
ξu,v +
∑
v∈E−
kv`v(kv)
∑
u∈E+
ψu,v
=
∑
u∈E+,v∈E−
(ξu,vku`u(ku) + ψu,vkv`v(kv)) =
∑
u∈E+,v∈E−
(
wu,v
ku − lu ku`u(ku) +
wu,v
lv − kv kv`v(kv)
)
=
∑
u∈E+,v∈E−
wu,v
(
ku
ku − lu `u(ku) +
kv
lv − kv `v(kv)
)
(10)
and
SUM(σ∗) =
∑
u∈E+
lu`u(lu) +
∑
v∈E−
lv`v(lv) =
∑
u∈E+
lu`u(lu)
∑
v∈E−
ξu,v +
∑
v∈E−
lu`v(lv)
∑
u∈E+
ψu,v
=
∑
u∈E+,v∈E−
(ξu,vlu`u(lu) + ψu,vlv`v(lv)) =
∑
u∈E+,v∈E−
(
wu,v
ku − lu lu`u(lu) +
wu,v
lv − kv lv`v(lv)
)
=
∑
u∈E+,v∈E−
wu,v
(
lu
ku − lu `u(lu) +
lv
lv − kv `v(lv)
)
. (11)
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By exploiting (10) and (11) we get:
SUM(σ)
SUM(σ∗)
=
∑
u∈E+,v∈E−
wu,v
(
ku
ku − lu `u(ku) +
kv
lv − kv `v(kv)
)
∑
u∈E+,v∈E−
wu,v
(
lu
ku − lu `u(lu) +
lv
lv − kv `v(lv)
) ≤ max
(u,v):u∈E+,v∈E−
ku
ku−lu `u(ku) +
kv
lv−kv `v(kv)
lu
ku−lu `u(lu) +
lv
lv−kv `v(lv)
= max
(u,v):u∈E+,v∈E−
ku
ku−lu (αufu(ku) + βu) +
kv
lv−kv (αvfv(kv) + βv)
lu
ku−lu (αufu(lu) + βu) +
lv
lv−kv (αvfv(lv) + βv)
. (12)
Let u ∈ E+, v ∈ E− be the resources maximizing (12), so that (12) is at most
F (αu, βu, αv, βv) :=
ku
ku−lu (αufu(ku) + βu) +
kv
lv−kv (αvfv(kv) + βv)
lu
ku−lu (αufu(lu) + βu) +
lv
lv−kv (αvfv(lv) + βv)
.
In the following, we show that max{γ([F ]H), ηθ([F ]H)} is an upper bound to F (αu, βu, αv, βv). By the equi-
librium conditions, we have that αufu(ku) + βu ≤ αvfv(kv) + βv. Only if kv = 0, it might be the case that
αufu(ku) + βu < αvfv(kv) + βv. In such a case, one can reduce the values of αv and βv as much as possible
so as to meet the θ-free-flow conditions, while guaranteeing that αufu(ku) + βu = αvfv(kv) + βv holds and the
value of F (αu, βu, αv, βv) does not decrease. Thus, we assume without loss of generality that the equilibrium
conditions are tight, i.e., αufu(ku) + βu = αvfv(kv) + βv holds. As βv ≤ (1 + θ)βu, and since kv < lv, we have
that, by increasing βv and decreasing αv as much as possible so that the θ-free-flow conditions are preserved,
the equilibrium conditions are satisfied, and the value αvfv(kv) +βv does not change, we get that αvfv(lv) +βv
does not increase, and then F (αu, βu, αv, βv) does not decrease. Thus, we can assume without loss of generality
that βu := βv/(1 + θ) (by the θ-free-flow conditions) and that αu := (αvfv(kv) + (1− 1/(1 + θ))βv)/fu(ku) (by
the equilibrium conditions). By using these values of αu and βu, we can prove the following result which yields
the claim:
Lemma 1. It holds that F (αu, βu, αv, βv) ≤ max {γ([F ]H), ηθ([F ]H)} .
Also in this case, the construction of the matching lower bounding instances is deferred to the appendix. uunionsq
4.2 Polynomial Latency Functions
As consequence of the previous results, we can determine the exact Price of Anarchy of free-flow congestion
games with polynomial latency functions. For the general case, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Fix a value θ ∈ [0,∞]. The Price of Anarchy of θ-free-flow congestion game with polynomial
latency functions of maximum degree p and minimum degree q is max {γ([Pp,q]H), γθ([Pp,q]H)}, with
γθ([Pp,q]H) = sup
t>1
tp(t(1 + θ)− 1)
tp(t− 1)(1 + θ) + θ , and (13)
γ([Pp,q]H) =
pp
(
p−q
√(
(p+1)p+1qq
(q+1)q+1pp
)p+1)
(p+ 1)p+1
(
p−q
√
(p+1)p+1qq
(q+1)q+1pp − 1
)χ[p−1](q) + χ{p}(q). (14)
For parallel-links games and free-flow path-disjoint network games, we get the following result.
Theorem 4. Fix a value θ ∈ [0,∞). The Price of Anarchy of both θ-free-flow parallel-links games and θ-
free-flow path-disjoint network congestion games with polynomial latency functions of maximum degree p and
minimum degree q is max {γ([Pp,q]H), ηθ([Pp,q]H)}, where
ηθ([Pp,q]H) = sup
t>1
tp+1(1 + θ)
tp+1(1 + θ) + (1− tp)θ ,
and γ([Pp,q]H) is defined as in Theorem 3.
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5 Interpretation and Discussion of the Results
In this section, we provide a detailed discussion of the implications of our theoretical results and how they relate
to previous work.
Congestion Games with Homogeneous Latency Functions. Consider the case of θ =∞, i.e., general congestion
games without the free-flow hypothesis. From [9], we know that λ(F) := supk>l>0,f∈FH kf(k)f(k)(k−l)+lf(l) is an
upper bound on the Price of Anarchy of congestion games with latency function in F , and such bound is tight,
even for parallel-links games, if F contains at least one constant function. However, if F is homogeneous, this
upper bound is not guaranteed to be tight.
As in the case of homogeneous latency functions any congestion game is a 0-free-flow game, by Theorems
1 and 2 and by the fact that γ0([F ]H) = η0([F ]H) = 1, we get that the price of anarchy is equal to γ(F) =
max{γ([F ]H), η0([F ]H)} = max{γ([F ]H), γ0([F ]H)} and it is attained even for parallel-links networks. Hence,
as a byproduct of our analysis, we close an open problem posed by Roughgarden [23], in which he asked if there
exists a simple parallel-links game matching the worst-case Price of Anarchy of arbitrary classes of homogeneous
latency functions.
Moreover, by exploiting Theorem 3 with F := [Pp,q]H , one can show by direct computation that γ(F) <
λ(F). Thus, we also obtain that the PoA for homogeneous functions may be strictly lower than the one for
functions admitting constant terms.
Free-Flow Games with Polynomial Latency Functions. By Theorem 3, the Price of Anarchy of θ-free-flow
congestion games with monomial latency functions of degree p ≥ 1 is
max{γ([Mp]H), γθ([Mp]H)} = max{γ([Mp]H), γ0([Mp]H)} = γ([Mp]H) = γ([WMp]H) = γ([Pp,p]H) = 1,
(where the first equality comes from the fact that, for homogeneous latency functions, a game is θ-free-flow if
and only if it is 0-free-flow, and the last equality comes from (14)), thus reobtaining a well-known result in the
literature (see, for instance, [13]). For weakly-monomial latency functions of degree p ≥ 1, instead, by Theorem
3, we get a bound of
max{γ([WMp]H), γθ([WMp]H)} = max{γθ([WMp]H), 1} = γθ([WMp]H) = γθ([Pp,p]H),
i.e., the value defined in (13). For the particular case of affine functions, i.e., class WM1, we reobtain the same
bounds of [3]. However, we give an improved result, as our lower bounds hold even for load balancing and
single-source network congestion games (in [3], tight lower bounds are given for general congestion games only).
For θ-free-flow path-disjoint games with weakly-monomial latency functions of degree p ≥ 1, by Theorem 4,
the Price of Anarchy gets equal to
max{γ([WMp]H), ηθ([WMp]H)} = ηθ([WMp]H) = ηθ([Pp,p]H) = (1 + θ)(p+ 1)
p+1
p
(1 + θ)(p+ 1)
p+1
p − θp
,
and it is tight even for parallel-links games with two resources only. Also in this case, with respect to affine
functions, we improve on the lower bounds given in [3].
Simpler Upper Bounds for Path-Disjoint Free-Flow Games. We observe that
ηθ([F ]H) = sup
k>l>0,f∈[F ]H
kf(k)(1 + θ)
kf(k)(1 + θ) + (lf(l)− lf(k))θ ≤ supk>l>0,f∈[F ]H
kf(k)(1 + θ)
kf(k)(1 + θ)− kf(k)θ = 1 + θ,
thus, by Theorem 2, the Price of Anarchy of path-disjoint free-flow games with latency functions in F is at most
max{1 + θ, γ([F ]H)}. Such upper bound is not tight in general as that considered in Theorem 2, but it does
not require the computation of ηθ([F ]H) for any θ > 0. Furthermore, if γ([F ]H) = 1 (as for weakly-monomial
latency functions), we have that the Price of Anarchy is at most 1 + θ, thus getting a simple and good upper
bound for small values of θ.
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General vs Path-Disjoint Free-Flow Games. Let F be a class of latency functions. By standard arguments
of calculus, one can show that max{γ([F ]H), ηθ([F ]H)} ≤ max{γ([F ]H), γθ([F ]H)} for any θ ∈ [0,∞), and
limθ→∞max{γ([F ]H), ηθ([F ]H)} = λ(F) = limθ→∞max{γ([F ]H), γθ([F ]H)}. Thus, the Price of Anarchy of
θ-free-flow path-disjoint games and that of general θ-free-flow congestion games converge to the same value.
However, the rate of convergence can be significantly lower in path-disjoint games. In fact, if F := WMp, by
Theorems 3 and 4, we have that
max{γ([F ]H), ηθ([F ]H)} = ηθ([WMp]H) < γθ([WMp]H) = max{γ([F ]H), γθ([F ]H)}.
For instance, for p = 4 and θ = 1, we get ηθ(WMp) = 1.3652 and γθ(WMp) = 1.6994. This is an important
difference with the classical setting with θ = ∞, where, given an arbitrary strongly diverse class of latency
functions F , the Price of Anarchy of general congestion games with latency functions in F is matched by a
parallel-links game. Instead, in our case the Price of Anarchy of general θ-free-flow can be higher even than the
one for θ-free-flow path-disjoint games.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we introduce the class of θ-free-flow routing games, aiming to capture the behavior of real-world
networks with a stronger assumption on edge costs than typical PoA analysis. This assumption is supported by
granular data of commuters’ car trips in Singapore. Indeed, the data shows evidence that agents only evaluate
a small subset of their entire strategy sets to solve the routing problem. Specifically, 75% of the agents would
consider paths that are at most 88% longer that the shortest path at free-flow. Price of anarchy analysis
in θ-free-flow routing games (and variants thereof) provides much tighter Price of Anarchy guarantees that
can be significantly smaller that the vanilla PoA bounds and which themselves are in better agreement with
experimental investigations of Price of Anarchy [18]. Furthermore, we show that the Price of Anarchy in θ-free-
flow routing games, in general, is not independent on the network topology, differently from what happens in
classical non-atomic congestion games [23].
As a by-product of our analysis, we also determine the structure of a parallel-links game that matches
the Price of Anarchy of games with homogeneous latency functions, thus solving an open problem posed by
Roughgarden [23], and we tighten several bounds on the Price of Anarchy shown in [3] for the case of affine
functions, which are extended to more general latency functions, too.
We hope that this paper opens up a new direction for tighter coupling between data analytics, modelling and
theory in congestion games and beyond. Analyzing different cities as well as introducing models that take into
account the difference between public and private transport seems like an exciting direction for future work.
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A Appendix
In the appendix, we use the following further definitions:
γˆθ([F ]H) := max{γθ([F ]H), γ([FH ])}, ηˆθ([F ]H) := max{ηθ([F ]H), γ([F ]H)}.
A.1 Tightness of the Upper Bound Shown in Theorem 1
In the following theorem, we show that the upper bound provided in Theorem 1 is tight for single-source network
games if F is weakly diverse and even for load balancing games if F is strongly diverse.
Theorem 5. Fix a value θ ∈ [0,∞], a class of latency functions F and a value M < γˆθ([F ]H). (i) If θ < ∞
and F is strongly diverse, there exists a (non-symmetric) θ-free-flow load balancing game LBGθ with latency
functions in F such that PoA(LBGθ) > M . (ii) If θ < ∞ and F is weakly diverse only, there exists a θ-free-
flow single-source network congestion game NCGθ such that PoA(NCGθ) > M . (iii) If θ = ∞, there exists a
path-disjoint network congestion game PNCG with latency functions in F such that PoA(PNCG) > M . (iv)
If θ = ∞ and F is scale-closed, there exists a parallel-link game PLG with latency functions in F such that
PoA(PLG) > M .
The proof of Theorem 5 consists into two further theorems (Theorem 6 and 10) and several preliminary results.
First of all, we show in Theorem 6 that the upper bound γθ([F ]H) is tight.
Theorem 6. Fix a value θ ∈ [0,∞), a class of latency functions F and a value M < γθ([F ]H). (i) If F
is strongly diverse, then there exists a (non-symmetric) load balancing θ-free-flow game LBGθ with latency
functions in F such that PoA(LBGθ) > M . (ii) If F is weakly diverse only, then there exists a single-source
network θ-free-flow congestion game NCGθ such that PoA(NCGθ) > M .
Proof. We first show part (i). We do not consider the case θ = 0, since in such case γθ([F ]H) = 1, and any
congestion game has a Price of Anarchy of at least 1. Thus, we assume that θ > 0. Let k, l > 0, with k > l,
and f ∈ [F ]H be such that γθ(k, l, f) := f(k)(kθ−l)f(k)(k−l)θ+lf(l)(θ−1) > M (such a triple (k, l, f) exists by the definition
of supremum and since M < γθ([F ]H)). Observe that k and l can be chosen in such a way that lnk is integer
for some n ∈ N. Indeed, if lnk is not integer, we proceed as follows. First of all, observe that function γθ(k, t, f)
is right-continuous in t ∈ (0, k) for any fixed k > 0 and f ∈ [F ]H . Since γθ(k, l, f) > M , by exploiting the
right-continuity of γθ(k, t, f), we have that there exists a value l
′ sufficiently close to l such that l
′n
k is an integer
and γθ(k, l
′, f) > M .
To construct the lower bounding instance, we resort to a representation called load balancing graph: (a) the
nodes are the resources, (b) each edge (u, v) is a player having two strategies {u} and {v}, where u (resp. v)
is called the first resource (resp. the second resource) of the considered player; (c) the weight we of any edge
e = (u, v) ∈ E denotes the total amount of players associated to edge (u, v). Given an integer m ≥ 2, let
LBGθ(m) be the load balancing game associated to a load balancing graph Gθ = (V,E) defined as follows: (a)
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the nodes of V are partitioned into m levels, where each level s ∈ [m] has nm−1 ( lk)m−s nodes (observe that
such number is an integer as lnk ∈ N); (b) for any level s ∈ [m− 1], there are nm
(
l
k
)m−s
edges going from s to
s+ 1 in such a way that the out-degree of each node u at level s is n, and the in-degree of each node v at level
s + 1 is lnk ; (c) we =
k
n for any edge e ∈ E, and the latency function of any node/resource at level s ∈ [m] is
defined as `s(x) = αsf(x) + βs, where αs = 1− (1 + θ)s−m, and βs = (1 + θ)s−mf(k). Observe that LBGθ(m)
is a θ-free-flow game (as βs(1 + θ) = βs+1 for any s ∈ [m− 1]) with latency functions in F .
Leg σ and σ∗ be the strategy profiles in which each player selects her first and her second resource, respec-
tively. Observe that ku(σ) = k (resp. ku(σ
∗) = l) for any resource u at level s ∈ [m − 1] (resp. s ∈ [m] \ {1}),
and ku(σ) = 0 for resources at level m (resp. 1). We show that σ is a pure Nash equilibrium. Given s ∈ [m− 1]
and a player (u, v) such that u is at level s, we get `s(ku(σ)) = αsf(ku(σ)) + βs = (1− (1 + θ)s−m)f(k) + (1 +
θ)s−mf(k) = f(k) = (1 − (1 + θ)s+1−m)f(k) + (1 + θ)s+1−mf(k) = αs+1f(kv(σ)) + βs+1 = `s+1(kv(σ)), and
this shows that σ is a pure Nash equilibrium. We have that
SUM(σ) =
m−1∑
s=1
nm−1
(
l
k
)m−s
k`s(k) =
m−1∑
s=1
nm−1
(
l
k
)m−s
kf(k), (15)
SUM(σ∗) =
m∑
s=2
nm−1
(
l
k
)m−s
l`s(l) =
m∑
s=2
nm−1
(
l
k
)m−s
l
(
(1− (1 + θ)s−m)f(l) + (1 + θ)s−mf(k)) . (16)
Given a sufficiently small  > 0 such that γθ(k, l, f) > M +  and a sufficiently large m, by using (15) and (16)
we get
PoA(LBG(m)θ) ≥ SUM(σ)
SUM(σ∗)
=
∑m−1
s=1 n
m−1 ( l
k
)m−s
kf(k)∑m
s=2 n
m−1 ( l
k
)m−s
l ((1− (1 + θ)s−m)f(l) + (1 + θ)s−mf(k))
=
∑m−2
s=0
(
k
l
)s
kf(k)(
k
l
)∑m−2
s=0
(
k
l
)s
l ((1− (1 + θ)s+2−m)f(l) + (1 + θ)s+2−mf(k))
=
∑m−2
s=0
(
k
l
)s
f(k)∑m−2
s=0
(
k
l
)s
((1− (1 + θ)s+2−m)f(l) + (1 + θ)s+2−mf(k))
=
(
( kl )
m−1−1
k
l −1
)
f(k)∑m−2
s=0
(
k
l
)s
f(l) +
∑m−2
s=0
(
k(1+θ)
l
)s
(1 + θ)−m+2(f(k)− f(l))
=
(
( kl )
m−1−1
k
l −1
)
f(k)(
( kl )
m−1−1
k
l −1
)
f(l) +
(
( k(1+θ)l )
m−1−1
k(1+θ)
l −1
)
(1 + θ)−m+2(f(k)− f(l))
≥ lim
m→∞
(
( kl )
m−1−1
k
l −1
)
f(k)(
( kl )
m−1−1
k
l −1
)
f(l) +
(
( k(1+θ)l )
m−1−1
k(1+θ)
l −1
)
(1 + θ)−m+2(f(k)− f(l))
− 
=
(
1
k
l −1
)
f(k)(
1
k
l −1
)
f(l) +
(
1
k
l − 11+θ
)
(f(k)− f(l))
− 
=
(
k
l − 11+θ
)
f(k)(
k
l − 11+θ
)
f(l) +
(
k
l − 1
)
(f(k)− f(l))
− 
=
f(k) (k(1 + θ)− l)
f(k) (k − l) (1 + θ) + lf(l)θ − 
= γθ(k, l, f)− 
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> M + − 
= M, (17)
and this shows part (i) of the claim.
Regarding part (ii), we resort to similar arguments as in [23]: we reconsider the lower bound instance of part
(i), and, by replacing each resource e with a path P simulating the latency function of e, we transform the load
balancing instance in a lower bounding instance having the structure of a single-source network congestion game.
Let us consider a load balancing game LBGθ defined as in part (i), such that PoA(LBGθ) > M . Let θ, k, l, f, n,m
be the parameters characterizing LBGθ, an let g ∈ F be a constant latency function defined as g(x) := β for
some β > 0 (such a function exists as F is weakly-diverse). We can assume without loss of generality that θ
and f(k)/β are rational numbers. Indeed, if it is not the case, as γθ(k, l, f) > M is continuous with respect to
variables θ, k, l, and f(x) is right-continuous in x, there exist θ′ < θ, k′ > k, l′ > 0, and an integer n′ ≥ 1, such
that γθ(k
′, l′, f) > M , k′ > l′ > 0, l
′n′
k′ is integer, and f(k
′)/β is rational. Thus, a load balancing instance LBG′θ
based on values θ′, k′, l′, f, n′,m is a θ-free-flow game (as θ′ < θ), and verifies PoA(LBG′θ) > M , and we can
choose LBG′θ in place of LBGθ.
Now, let NCGθ be a single-source network congestion game constructed from LBGθ as follows. Consider
an undirected graph G = (V ′, E′) initially empty. Let g be a constant function, with g(x) = β for some
β > 0. For any resource e at level s ∈ [m], we add in G a source-node u∗, and two consecutive directed paths
Pe := (u
′
e,0, u
′
e,1, . . . , u
′
e,as) and Qe = (v
′
e,0, v
′
e,1, . . . , v
′
e,bs
) with u′e,0 = u
∗ and u′e,as = v
′
e,0, in such a way that
there exists an integer h (not depending on the level s) such that as = ash and βe = bsh/β, where αs and βe are
defined as in part (i). Such an integer exists since, by our choice of θ and k, quantities αs and βs/β are rational
numbers. The latency function of each edge of paths of type Pe (resp. Qe) is f (resp. g). For any amount of
players of LBGθ having u and v as first and second resource respectively, we include the same amount of players
in NCGθ, whose strategies are all the simple paths from u
∗ to the last node of Qu, denoted as zv. The unique
simple paths from v to the last node of Qu are (Pu, Qu) and (Pv, Qv) only, denoted respectively as first and
second path of player of type (u∗, zv).
As shown for LBGθ in part (i), NCGθ is a θ-free-flow game as well. Let φ and φ
∗ be the strategy profiles
in which each player selects her first path and her second path, respectively. By adapting the proof-arguments
used in part (i) to game NCGθ, one can easily show that the strategy profile φ is a pure Nash equilibrium, and
that PoA(NCGθ) ≥ SUM(φ)SUM(φ∗) ≥ γθ(k, l, f)−  > M + −  = M . uunionsq
In Theorem 10, we address the lower bound γ(F) which, does not depend on θ. For such a reason, the lower
bound is proven with respect to classical congestion games (i.e., as if θ =∞). In the proof of Theorem 5, it will
be clarified how to use this result to give tight lower bounds holding also for general free-flow games. We first
give some preliminary notations and results.
Given a class F of latency functions and a value x ∈ [1,∞), define
γ>(F , x) := sup
k>l>0,f∈F
(
k + x(−k + l)
l
)
f(k)
f(l)
,
γ≤(F , x) := sup
l>0,0≤k≤l,f∈F
(
k + x(−k + l)
l
)
f(k)
f(l)
,
Observe that γ>(F , x) and γ≤(F , x), which are functions from [1,∞) to R≥0 ∪ {∞}, are, respectively, non-
increasing and non-decreasing in x. Moreover, γ>(F , 1) ≥ γ≤(F , 1). In the following lemma, we show that
γ≤(F , x(F)) and γ>(F , x) are continuous in x ≥ 1.
Lemma 2. Both γ≤(F , x) and γ>(F , x) are continuous in x ≥ 1.
Proof. When showing the continuity of γ≤(F , x) and γ>(F , x), we implicitly consider the topological space
R≥0 ∪ {∞} as codomain.
Let us start with γ≤(F , x). First of all, we show that γ≤(F , x) is right-continuous in x ≥ 1. Fix a value
x ≥ 1. If γ≤(F , x) = ∞, as γ≤(F , x) is non-decreasing, the right-continuity follows. Now, we assume that
γ≤(F , x) <∞. We have that
sup
0≤k≤l,f∈F :l>0
f(k)
f(l)
≤ sup
0≤k≤l,f∈F :l>0
(
k + (x+ δ)(−k + l)
l
)
f(k)
f(l)
= γ≤(F , x) <∞.
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Thus, there exists a constant c > 0 such that sup0≤k≤l,f∈F :l>0
f(k)
f(l) ≤ c. Let δ := /c. Given ξ ∈ [x, x + δ), we
get
γ≤(F , ξ) ≤ γ≤(F , x+ δ)
= sup
0≤k≤l,f∈F
(
k + (x+ δ)(−k + l)
l
)
f(k)
f(l)
≤ sup
0≤k≤l,f∈F :l>0
(
k + x(−k + l)
l
)
f(k)
f(l)
+ sup
0≤k≤l,f∈F :l>0
δ(−k + l)
l
f(k)
f(l)
≤ sup
0≤k≤l,f∈F :l>0
(
k + x(−k + l)
l
)
f(k)
f(l)
+ δ sup
0≤k≤l,f∈F :l>0
f(k)
f(l)
≤ sup
0≤k≤l,f∈F :l>0
(
k + x(−k + l)
l
)
f(k)
f(l)
+ cδ
= γ≤(F , x) + ,
thus, by the arbitrariness of , γ≤(F , x) is right-continuous in x.
Now, we show that γ>(F , x) is left-continuous in x > 1 (for our aim, the left-continuity does not make
sense in x = 1). Fix two values x > 1 and M < γ≤(F , x), and let  be an arbitrary number such that
0 <  < γ≤(F , x)−M . By the definition of supremum, there exists a triple (k, l, f) with l ≤ k ≤ l, and f ∈ F
such that fk,l,f (x) :=
(
k+x(−k+l)
l
)
f(k)
f(l) > M + . By continuity of fk,l,f (x) in x > 1, we have that there exists
δ > 0 such that fk,l,f (ξ) > (M + )−  = M for any ξ ∈ (x− δ, x], and by the definition of supremum and the
monotonicity of γ≤(F , ξ), we get γ≤(F , x) ≥ γ≤(F , ξ) = sup0≤k≤l,f∈F :l>0 fk,l,f (ξ) > M for any ξ ∈ (x + δ, x].
Thus, by the arbitrariness of M , the left-continuity follows.
Now, we proceed with γ>(F , x). First of all, we show that γ>(F , x) is left-continuous in x > 1 (observe that
left-continuity in x = 1 does not make sense). Fix a value x > 1. If γ>(F , x) = ∞, the left-continuity follows,
as γ>(F , x) is non-increasing in x > 1.
Now, assume that γ>(F , x) <∞. Let y be an arbitrary number such that x−1x < y < 1. We necessarily have
that supl>0,f∈F
f( xyx−1 l)
f(l) <∞. Indeed, if this is not the case, by setting k∗ := xyl(x−1) we have that
(
k∗+x(−k∗+l)
l
)
=
x(1− y) > 0, and then ∞ = x(1− y) supl>0,f∈F
f( xyx−1 l)
f(l) = supl>0,f∈F
(
k∗+x(−k∗+l)
l
)
f(k∗)
f(l) ≤ γ>(F , x), but this
contradicts the hypothesis γ>(F , x) <∞. Thus, we get the following fact:
Fact 7 There exists a constant b such that b >
f( xyx−1 l)
f(l) for any l > 0 and f ∈ F .
Let ψ be an arbitrary number such that 1 < ψ < x. Observe that k + ξ(−k + l) < 0 for any ξ ∈ [ψ, x] and for
any k > ψlψ−1 . Thus, when evaluating the supremum of
(
k+x(−k+l)
l
)
f(k)
f(l) , we can avoid considering all values
k > ψlψ−1 , and we get the following fact:
Fact 8 γ>(F , x) = supk>l>0,f∈F :k≤ ψlψ−1
(
k+ξ(−k+l)
l
)
f(k)
f(l) for any ξ ∈ [ψ, x].
Let h be the first integer such that
(
xy
x−1
)h
≥ ψψ−1 , and let c := b
h
ψ−1 . We have that
sup
k>l>0,f∈F :k≤ ψlψ−1
(
k − l
l
)
f(k)
f(l)
≤ sup
k>l>0,f∈F :k≤ ψlψ−1
(
k − l
l
)
sup
k>l>0,f∈F :k≤ ψlψ−1
f(k)
f(l)
≤ 1
ψ − 1 supl>0,f∈F
f
(
ψl
ψ−1
)
f(l)
≤ 1
ψ − 1 supl>0,f∈F
h∏
i=1
f
((
xy
x−1
)i
l
)
f
((
xy
x−1
)i−1
l
)
≤ 1
ψ − 1 supf∈F
h∏
i=1
sup
l>0
f
((
xy
x−1
)i
l
)
f
((
xy
x−1
)i−1
l
)

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=
1
ψ − 1 supf∈F
h∏
i=1
sup
l>0
f
((
xy
x−1
)
l
)
f (l)

≤ 1
ψ − 1 supf∈F b
h (18)
=
bh
ψ − 1
= c, (19)
where (18) comes from Fact 7. Thus, by (19), we get the following fact:
Fact 9 There exists a constant c > 0 such that
sup
k>l>0,f∈F :k≤ ψlψ−1
(
k − l
l
)
f(k)
f(l)
≤ c.
Now, given an arbitrary  > 0, let δ := min{x− ψ, /c}. For any ξ ∈ (x− δ, x] we have that:
γ>(F , ξ) ≤ γ>(F , x− δ)
= sup
k>l>0,f∈F :k≤ ψlψ−1
(
k + (x− δ)(−k + l)
l
)
f(k)
f(l)
(20)
≤ sup
k>l>0,f∈F :k≤ ψlψ−1
(
k + x(−k + l)
l
)
f(k)
f(l)
+ δ sup
k>l>0,f∈F :k≤ ψlψ−1
(
k − l
l
)
f(k)
f(l)
≤ sup
k>l>0,f∈F :k≤ ψlψ−1
(
k + x(−k + l)
l
)
f(k)
f(l)
+ δc (21)
= γ>(F , x) + δc,
≤ γ>(F , x) + ,
where (20) comes from Fact 8 and (21) comes from Fact 9. Thus, by the arbitrariness of , γ>(F , x) is left-
continuous in x.
Now, we show that γ>(F , x) is right-continuous in x ≥ 1. Fix two values x ≥ 1 andM < γ>(F , x), and let  be
an arbitrary number such that 0 <  < γ>(F , x)−M . By the definition of supremum, there exists a triple (k, l, f)
with 0 < l < k and f ∈ F such that fk,l,f (x) :=
(
k+x(−k+l)
l
)
f(k)
f(l) > M + . By continuity of fk,l,f (x) in x ≥ 1,
we have that there exists δ > 0 such that fk,l,f (ξ) > (M+)− = M for any ξ ∈ [x, x+δ), and by the definition
of supremum and the monotonicity of γ>(F , ξ), we get γ>(F , x) ≥ γ>(F , ξ) = sup0<l<k,f∈F fk,l,f (ξ) > M for
any ξ ∈ [x, x+ δ). Thus, by the arbitrariness of M , the right-continuity follows. uunionsq
By using the previous results, we get the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let 1 ≤ x0 ≤ x1 be such that γ>(F , x1) ≤ γ≤(F , x1), and let x0 := 1 or such that γ>(F , x0) ≥
γ≤(F , x0). Then there exists xˆ ∈ [x0, x1] such that γ(F) = γ>(F , xˆ) = γ≤(F , xˆ). If such x1 does not exists, then
γ(F) = limx→∞ γ>(F , x) = limx→∞ γ≤(F , x) =∞ and γ>(F , x) > γ≤(F , x) for any x ≥ 1.
Proof. Let 1 ≤ x0 ≤ x1 be such that γ>(F , x1) ≤ γ≤(F , x1) and γ>(F , x0) ≥ γ≤(F , x0). We do not consider
separately the case x0 = 1, since γ>(F , 1) = supk>l>0,f∈F f(k)f(l) ≥ sup0≤l≤k,f∈F :l>0 f(k)f(l) = γ≤(F , 1). Since
γ>(F , x) and γ≤(F , x) are continuous in x ≥ 1 (as shown in Lemma 2), we necessarily have that γ>(F , xˆ) =
γ≤(F , xˆ) = γ(F) (by the Intermediate Zero Theorem), and the claim follows. If there is no x1 ≥ 1 such that
γ>(F , xˆ) ≤ γ≤(F , xˆ), we necessarily have that γ(F) = limx→∞ γ>(F , x) ≥ limx→∞ γ≤(F , x), where the first
equality follows from the monotonicity of γ>(F , x). Thus, as limx→∞ γ≤(F , x) =∞, the claim follows. uunionsq
The following lemma is the main ingredient to show the desired lower bound, and the proof is based on Lemma
3.
Lemma 4. Fix a value M < γ(F). Then, there exist k1, l1, f1, k2, l2, f2 with f1, f2 ∈ F , k1 > l1 > 0, 0 ≤ k2 ≤
l2, and l2 > 0, such that
γ(k1, l1, f1, k2, l2, f2) :=
(l2 − k2)f2(k2)k1f1(k1) + (k1 − l1)f1(k1)k2f2(k2)
(l2 − k2)f2(k2)l1f1(l1) + (k1 − l1)f1(k1)l2f2(l2) > M.
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Proof. First of all, assume that there exists x1 > 1 such that γ>(F , x1) < γ≤(F , x1). By Lemma 3, we have
that γ(F) = γ>(F , xˆ) = γ≤(F , xˆ) for some xˆ ∈ [1, x1]. Thus, by the definition of supremum, there exist two
triples (k1, l1, f1) and (k2, l2, f2), with k1 > l1 > 0, 0 ≤ k2 ≤ l2, f1, f2 ∈ F , and l2 > 0, such that(
k1 + xˆ(−k1 + l1)
l1
)
f1(k1)
f1(l1)
> M,
(
k2 + xˆ(−k2 + l2)
l2
)
f2(k2)
f2(l2)
> M. (22)
As k2 ≤ l2 and l1 < k1, we have that there exists x∗ > 0 such that γ∗ :=
(
k1+x
∗(−k1+l1)
l1
)
f1(k1)
f1(l1)
=(
k2+x
∗(−k2+l2)
l2
)
f2(k2)
f2(l2)
. Then, by (22), (x∗, γ∗) is the optimal solution of the following linear program in variables
x, γ:
D̂LP : min γ
s.t. γ ≥ k1f1(k1) + x(−k1f1(k1) + l1f1(k1))
l1f1(l1)
, (23)
γ ≥ k2f2(k2) + x(−k2f2(k2) + l2f2(k2))
l2f2(l2)
, (24)
x ≥ 0,
and constraints (23) and (24) are tight for x = x∗. By considering the dual of the linear program considered
above we get the following linear program in variables α1, α2:
L̂P : max α1k1f1(k1) + α2k2f2(k2)
s.t. α1(k1 − l1)f1(k1) + α2(k2 − l2)f2(k2) ≤ 0 (25)
α1l1f1(l1) + α2l2f2(l2) = 1 (26)
α1, α2 ≥ 0.
By the Strong Duality Theorem, the optimal solution of L̂P has value γ∗ > M . Furthermore, since x∗ > 0, by
the complementary slackness conditions, we have that the optimal solution (α∗1, α
∗
2) of L̂P is such that constraint
(25) is tight, that, together with constraint (26), gives
α∗1 =
(l2 − k2)f2(k2)
(l2 − k2)f2(k2)l1f1(l1) + (k1 − l1)f1(k1)l2f2(l2) ≥ 0
α∗2 =
(k1 − l1)f1(k1)
(l2 − k2)f2(k2)l1f1(l1) + (k1 − l1)f1(k1)l2f2(l2) ≥ 0.
By putting α∗1 and α
∗
2 in the objective function of L̂P, we get the optimal value γ
∗ of L̂P, that is
M < γ∗ = α∗1k1f1(k1) + α
∗
2k2f2(k2) =
(l2 − k2)f2(k2)k1f1(k1) + (k1 − l1)f1(k1)k2f2(k2)
(l2 − k2)f2(k2)l1f1(l1) + (k1 − l1)f1(k1)l2f2(l2) ≤ γ(F),
and this shows the claim.
Finally, if there is no xˆ ≥ 1 such that γ>(F , xˆ) = γ≤(F , xˆ), by Lemma 3, we have that γ(F) = limx→∞ γ>(F , x) =
limx→∞ γ≤(F , x) =∞ and γ>(F , x) > γ≤(F , x) for any x ≥ 1. Thus, by the definition of supremum, there exist
a sufficiently large xˆ ≥ 1, two triples (k1, l1, f1) and (k2, l2, f2), with k1 > l1 > 0, 0 < k2 ≤ l2, f1, f2 ∈ F , such
that (
k1 + xˆ(−k1 + l1)
l1
)
f1(k1)
f1(l1)
>
(
k2 + xˆ(−k2 + l2)
l2
)
f2(k2)
f2(l2)
> M.
thus, using the same arguments as in the previous case, one can show the claim as well. uunionsq
Armed with the above lemma, we are ready to show Theorem 10.
Theorem 10. Fix a class of latency functions F and a value M < γ(F). (i) There exists a path-disjoint network
congestion game PNCG with latency functions in F such that PoA(PNCG) > M . (ii) If F is scale-closed, then
there exists a parallel-link game PLG with latency functions in F such that PoA(PLG) > M .
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Proof. We first show part (ii). Let k1, l1, f1, k2, l2, f2 be the quantities specified in the claim of Lemma 4, i.e.,
such that f1, f2 ∈ F , k1 > l1 > 0, and 0 ≤ k2 ≤ l2, and γ(k1, l1, f1, k2, l2, f2) > M . Observe that k1, l1, k2, l2
can be chosen in such a way that (k1−l1)nl2−k2 is an integer for some n ∈ N and in such a way that l2 > k2.
Indeed, assume that such property is not satisfied. As γ(k1, l1, f1, k1, l2, f2) is continuous in l2, by using similar
arguments as in the proof of Theorem 6, one can consider a value l′2 in place of l2, in such a way that 0 ≤ k2 < l′2,
γ(k1, l1, f1, k2, l
′
2, f2) > M , and
(k1−l1)n
l′2−k2 is an integer for some n ∈ N.
Let PLG be a parallel-link game defined as follows: (a) the set of resources E is partitioned into two subsets
E+ and E−; (b) E+ contains n resources having latency function defined as `+(x) := f2(k2)f1(x), and E−
contains k1−l1l2−k2n resources having latency function defined as `
−(x) := f1(k1)f2(x); (c) the total amount of
players is
(
k1 +
(k1−l1)k2
l2−k2
)
n. Let σ (resp. σ∗) be the strategy profile in which each resource of E+ is selected
by k1 (resp. l1) players and each resource of E
− is selected by k2 (resp. l2) players. One can easily observe that
all resources have the same latency in σ, thus σ is a pure Nash equilibrium. We have that
SUM(σ) = |E+|k1`+(k1) + |E−|k2`−(k2) =
(
k1f2(k2)f1(k1) +
(k1 − l1)f1(k1)k2f2(k2)
l2 − k2
)
n
SUM(σ∗) = |E+|l1`+(l1) + |E−|l2`−(l2) =
(
l1f2(k2)f1(l1) +
(k1 − l1)f1(k1)l2f2(l2)
l2 − k2
)
n,
thus
PoA(PLG) ≥ SUM(σ)
SUM(σ∗)
=
(
k1f2(k2)f1(k1) +
(k1−l1)f1(k1)k2f2(k2)
l2−k2
)
n(
l1f2(k2)f1(l1) +
(k1−l1)f1(k1)l2f2(l2)
l2−k2
)
n
= γ(k1, l1, f1, k2, l2, f2) > M,
and this shows the claim.
Regarding part (i), we resort to a similar proof as in Theorem 6: we reconsider the lower bounding instance
of part (ii), and transform it in a lower bounding instance having the structure of a path-disjoint network
congestion game. Let us consider a parallel-link game PLG defined as in part (ii) such that PoA(PLG) > M .
Let k1, l1, f1, k2, l2, f2, n be the parameters characterizing PLG. By using similar arguments as in the proof of
Theorem 6, we can assume without loss of generality that f1(k1) and f2(k2) are rational numbers.
Let PNCG be a path-disjoint network congestion game constructed from PLG as follows. Consider an undi-
rected graph G = (V ′, E′) initially empty. We add in G a source-node u∗ and a sink-node v∗. Then, for any re-
source e of group E+ (resp. E−), we add a path Pe := (u∗, u′e,1, . . . , u
′
e,n−1, v
∗) (resp.Qe = (u∗, v′e,1, . . . , v
′
e,h−1, v
∗)
with h := (k1−l1)nl2−k2 ). The latency function of each edge of paths of type Pe (resp. Qe) is f1 (resp. f2). The amount
of players is the same as in PLG, and their possible strategies are all the simple paths from u∗ to v∗.
Let φ (resp. φ∗) be the strategy profile in which each path of type Pe (resp. Qe) is selected by the same
amount of player selecting resource e in σ (resp. in σ∗). By adapting the proof-arguments used in part (ii) to
game PNCG, one can easily show that the strategy profile φ is a pure Nash equilibrium, and that PoA(PNCG) ≥
SUM(φ)
SUM(φ∗) = γ(k1, l1, f1, k2, l2, f2) > M , thus showing the claim. uunionsq
By using Theorem 6 and 10, we can show Theorem 5.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 5). Recall that γˆθ([F ]H) = max{γθ([F ]H), γ([F ]H)} and observe that, when consider-
ing latency functions in [F ]H (i.e., homogeneous functions), any congestion game is also a θ-free-flow game for
any θ ∈ [0,∞]. Thus, we can apply Theorem 10 with respect to the value γ([F ]H).
First of all, we show parts (i) and (ii). If [F ]H is strongly diverse, then it is also scale-closed, and so the
claim follows from Theorems 6 (part (i)) and 10 (part (ii)). If [F ]H is weakly diverse, then the claim follows
from Theorems 6 (part (ii)) and 10 (part (i)).
Regarding parts (iii) and (iv), as γˆθ([F ]H) = γ([F ]H), the lower bound given in Theorem 10 exactly matches
the upper bound provided by Theorem 1. uunionsq
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3
To show the claim, by Theorems 1 and 5, and since Pp,q is strongly diverse, it suffices computing the values of
γθ([Pp,q]H) and γ([Pp,q]H). We get
γθ([Pp,q]H) = sup
k>l>0,f∈[Pp,q ]H
f(k)(k(1 + θ)− l)
f(k)(k − l)(1 + θ) + lf(l)θ
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= sup
k>l>0,(αq,αq+1,...,αp)>0
(∑p
d=q αdk
d
)
(k(1 + θ)− l)(∑p
d=q αdk
d
)
(k − l)(1 + θ) + l
(∑p
d=q αdl
d
)
θ
= sup
k>l>0,(αq,αq+1,...,αp)>0
∑
d∈[p] αd
(
kd(k(1 + θ)− l))∑p
d=q αd (k
d(k − l)(1 + θ) + ld+1θ)
= max
d∈[p]\[q−1]
sup
k>l>0
kd(k(1 + θ)− l)
kd(k − l)(1 + θ) + ld+1θ
= max
d∈[p]\[q−1]
sup
t>1
td(t(1 + θ)− 1)
td(t− 1)(1 + θ) + θ
= max
d∈[p]\[q−1]
sup
t>1
tp(t(1 + θ)− 1)
tp(t− 1)(1 + θ) + tp−dθ
= sup
t>1
tp(t(1 + θ)− 1)
tp(t− 1)(1 + θ) + θ ,
thus obtaining (13). To compute γ([Pp,q]H), we use the characterization given in Lemma 3. Given x ≥ 1, we
have that:
γ>([Pp,q]H , x) = sup
k>l>0,f∈[Pp,q ]H
(
k + x(−k + l)
l
)
f(k)
f(l)
= sup
k>l>0,(αq,αq+1,...,αp)>0
(
k + x(−k + l)
l
) ∑p
d=q αdk
d∑p
d=q αdl
d
= sup
k>l>0
(
k + x(−k + l)
l
)
kp
lp
= sup
t>1
(t+ x(−t+ 1)) tp
=
ppxp+1
(p+ 1)p+1(x− 1)pχ[p+1](x) + χ{p+1,...,∞}(x), (27)
and
γ≤([Pp,q]H , x) = sup
0<k≤l,f∈[Pp,q ]H :l>0
(
k + x(−k + l)
l
)
f(k)
f(l)
= sup
0≤k≤l,(αq,αq+1,...,αp)>0:l>0
(
k + x(−k + l)
l
) ∑p
d=q αdk
d∑p
d=q αdl
d
= sup
0≤k≤l:l>0
(
k + x(−k + l)
l
)
kq
lq
= sup
t∈[0,1]
(t+ x(−t+ 1)) tq
=
qqxq+1
(q + 1)q+1(x− 1)q χ{q+1,...,∞}(x) + χ[q+1](x). (28)
Let x0 := q + 1 and x1 := p+ 1. Observe that (27) (resp. (28)) is decreasing (resp. increasing) in x ∈ [1, p+ 1]
(resp. x ≥ q + 1) and equal to 1 if x ≥ p + 1 (resp. x ∈ [q + 1]). Thus, we have that γ≤([Pp,q]H , x0) = 1 ≤
γ>([Pp,q]H , x0) and γ≤([Pp,q]H , x1) ≥ 1 = γ>([Pp,q]H , x1). By Lemma 3, there exists xˆ ∈ [q + 1, p + 1] such
that γ([Pp,q]H) = γ≤([Pp,q]H , xˆ) = γ>([Pp,q]H , xˆ). If q = p, we necessarily have that xˆ = p + 1, and then
γ([Pp,q]H) = γ≤([Pp,q]H , xˆ) = γ>([Pp,q]H , xˆ) = 1, thus (14) holds. If p > q, by using the characterizations
exploited in (27) and (28), we have that xˆ necessarily verifies q
qxˆq+1
(q+1)q+1(xˆ−1)q =
ppxˆp+1
(p+1)p+1(xˆ−1)p , that is xˆ =
p−q
√
(p+1)p+1qq
(q+1)q+1pp /
(
p−q
√
(p+1)p+1qq
(q+1)q+1pp − 1
)
. Finally, by substituting the value of xˆ in γ>([Pp,q]H , xˆ), we get (14).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
By substituting βu := βv/(1 + θ) and αu := (αvfv(kv) + (1 − 1/(1 + θ))βv)/fu(ku) in the definition of
F (αu, βu, αv, βv), we get
F (αu, βu, αv, βv)
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=
(
ku
ku−lu +
kv
lv−kv
)
(αvfv(kv) + βv)
lu
ku−lu
((
αvfv(kv)+(1− 11+θ )βv
fu(ku)
)
fu(lu) +
βv
1+θ
)
+ lvlv−kv (αvfv(lv) + βv)
=
αv
((
ku
ku−lu +
kv
lv−kv
)
fv(kv)
)
+ βv
(
ku
ku−lu +
kv
lv−kv
)
αv
(
lufv(kv)fu(lu)
(ku−lu)fu(ku) +
lvfv(lv)
lv−kv
)
+ βv
(
lu
ku−lu
(
(1− 11+θ )fu(lu)
fu(ku)
+ 11+θ
)
+ lvlv−kv
)
≤ max
 (lv − kv)fv(kv)kufu(ku) + (ku − lu)fu(ku)kvfv(kv)(lv − kv)fv(kv)lufu(lu) + (ku − lu)fu(ku)lvfv(lv) ,
ku
ku−lu +
kv
lv−kv
lu
ku−lu
(
θfu(lu)+fu(ku)
(1+θ)fu(ku)
)
+ lvlv−kv
 . (29)
Now, we exploit the following facts:
Fact 11 We have that:
(l2 − k2)f2(k2)k1f1(k1) + (k1 − l1)f1(k1)k2f2(k2)
(l2 − k2)f2(k2)l1f1(l1) + (k1 − l1)f1(k1)l2f2(l2) ≤ γ([F ]H)
for any k1, l1, f1, k2, l2, f2 such that k1 > l1 ≥ 0, l2 > k2 ≥ 0, and f1, f2 ∈ [F ]H .
Proof. Reconsider the proof of Lemma 4. We have that γ(k1, l1, f1, k2, l2, f2) is the optimal value of D̂LP (where
L̂P is based on k1, l1, f1, k2, l2, f2). As the dual of D̂LP is L̂P and the optimal value of L̂P is upper bounded by
γ([F ]H), inequality γ(k1, l1, f1, k2, l2, f2) ≤ γ([F ]H) follows by the Weak Duality Theorem. uunionsq
Fact 12 We have that
ku
ku−lu +
kv
lv−kv
lu
ku−lu
(
θfu(lu)+fu(ku)
(1+θ)fu(ku)
)
+ lvlv−kv
≤ ηθ([F ]H). (30)
Proof. Let a := kuku−lu , b :=
lu
ku−lu
(
θfu(lu)+fu(ku)
(1+θ)fu(ku)
)
, and t := kvlv ∈ [0, 1), so that the left-hand side of (30) is
equal to a+t/(1−t)b+1/(1−t) . As 1 ≤ PoA(PLGθ) ≤ a+t/(1−t)b+1/(1−t) , we necessarily have that a ≥ b. Thus, by standard arguments
of calculus, one can show that a+t/(1−t)b+1/(1−t) is maximized by t = 0, i.e.,
a+t/(1−t)
b+1/(1−t) ≤ ab+1 . Thus,
a+ t1−t
b+ 11−t
≤ a
b+ 1
=
fu(ku)ku(1 + θ)
fu(ku)ku(1 + θ) + (lufu(lu)− lufu(ku))θ ≤ ηθ([F ]H). (31)
uunionsq
By using the previous facts, we get that (29) is upper bounded by max {γ([F ]H), ηθ([F ]H)}.
A.4 Case of Path-disjoint Network Games in Theorem 2
Let F ′ := {g : g(x) = ∑sr=1 fr(x) ∀x > 0, f1, . . . , fs ∈ F , s ≥ 1}, i.e., F ′ is the smallest class of latency
functions containing F and closed under sums of latency functions. Let PNCGθ be a θ-free-flow path-disjoint
network congestion game with latency functions in F . As F ⊆ F ′, PNCGθ has also latency functions in F ′.
For any strategy/path P of PNCGθ, we replace P with a unique resource eP having latency function defined
as `′eP (x) :=
∑
e∈P `e(x), where `e is the latency function of edge e in game PNCGθ. By construction of F ′, we
have that `′eP ∈ F ′ for any path P of PNCGθ. Thus, the resulting game is a θ-free-flow parallel-link game with
latency function in F ′ whose Price of Anarchy is at most ηˆθ([F ′]H) = max{ηθ([F ′]H), γ([F ′]H)}. We observe
that:
ηθ([F ′]H) := sup
k>l>0,f1,...,fs∈[F ]H :s≥1
∑s
r=1 kfr(k)θ∑s
r=1(kfr(k)θ + (ofr(l)− ofr(k))(θ − 1))
= sup
k>l>0,f∈[F ]H
kf(k)θ
kf(k)θ + (lf(l)− lf(k))(θ − 1)
= ηθ([F ]H),
and with analogue proof arguments, we get γ([F ′]H) = γ([F ]H). We conclude that PoA(PNCGθ) ≤ ηˆθ([F ′]H) =
max{ηθ([F ′]H), γ([F ′]H)} = max{ηθ([F ]H), γ([F ]H)} = ηˆθ([F ]H), thus showing the claim.
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A.5 Tightness of the Upper Bound Shown in Theorem 2
Theorem 13. Fix a value θ ∈ [0,∞), a class of latency functions F and a value M < ηˆθ([F ]H). (i) If F
is strongly diverse, there exists a θ-free-flow parallel-link game PLGθ with latency functions in F such that
PoA(PLGθ) > M . (ii) If F is weakly-diverse only, there exists a θ-free-flow path-disjoint network congestion
game PNCGθ with latency functions in F such that PoA(PNCGθ) > M .
Proof. As Theorem 10 guarantees the existence of parallel-link games and symmetric network congestion games
whose Price of Anarchy is at least M for M < γ([F ]H) and when considering homogeneous latency functions
any congestion game is θ-free-flow for any value of θ, it is sufficient to show the claim for M < ηθ([F ]H).
We first show part (i). Fix M < ηθ([F ]H), and let k, l, f such that f ∈ [F ]H , k > l > 0, and ηθ(k, l, f) :=
kf(k)(1+θ)
kf(k)(1+θ)+(lf(l)−lf(k))θ > M . Consider a parallel-link game PLGθ with two resources u and v and an amount of
players equal to k, where u and v have latency function defined as `u(x) = θf(x)+f(k) and `v(x) = (1+θ)f(k),
respectively. Observe that `u(0)(1 + θ) = `v(0), thus PLGθ is with a θ-free-flow game.
Let σ (resp. σ∗) be the strategy profile such that k (resp. l) players select resource u, and 0 (resp. k − l)
players select resource v. One can easily observe that `u(ku(σ)) = (1 + θ)f(k) = `v(kv(σ)), thus σ is a pure
Nash equilibrium. We have that
SUM(σ) = k`u(k) = kf(k)(1 + θ),
SUM(σ∗) = l`u(l) + (k − l)`v(k − l)
= lf(l)θ + lf(k) + (k − l)f(k)(1 + θ)
= kf(k)(1 + θ) + (lf(l)− lf(k))θ, (32)
thus PoA(PLGθ) ≥ SUM(σ)SUM(σ∗) = kf(k)(1+θ)kf(k)(1+θ)+(lf(l)−lf(k))θ = ηθ(k, l, f) > M , and this shows the claim.
Regarding part (ii), it is sufficient considering a similar arguments as in Theorem 6 and 10. Let k, l and f be
defined as in part (i), and let g ∈ F be a constant latency function defined as g(x) := β. As shown in Theorems
6 and 10, one can assume without loss of generality that f(k)/β and θ are rational numbers, and (k− l)n is an
integer for some n ∈ N.
Let PNCGθ be a path-disjoint network congestion game constructed from PLGθ as follows. Consider an
undirected graph G = (V ′, E′) initially empty. We add in G a source-node u∗ and a sink-node v∗. Let h ∈ N be
such that a := θh, b := f(k)h/β, and c := (1 + θ)f(k)h/β are integers. As f(k)/β and θ are rational numbers,
such an integer h exists. Then, we add two consecutive paths P := (u′0, u
′
1, . . . , u
′
a) and Q = (v
′
0, v
′
1, . . . , v
′
b)
with u′0 = u
∗, u′a = v
′
u,0, and v
′
b = v
∗, such that the latency function of each edge in P (resp. Q) is defined
as `′(x) := f(x) (resp. `′(x) := g(x) = β). Let P + Q be the path obtained by concatenating paths P and Q.
Finally, we add a path R := (r′0, r
′
1, . . . , r
′
c), with r
′
0 = u
∗ and r′c = v
∗ such that the latency function of each
edge in R is defined as `′(x) = g(x).
As shown for PLGθ in part (i), PNCGθ is a θ-free-flow game as well. Let φ (resp. φ
∗) be the strategy profile
in which path P +Q is selected by an amount of k (resp. l) players and path R is selected by an amount of 0
(resp. k − l) players. By adapting the proof-arguments used in part (i) for game PNCGθ, one can easily show
that the strategy profile φ is a pure Nash equilibrium, and that PoA(PNCGθ) ≥ SUM(φ)SUM(φ∗) = ηθ(k, l, f) > M , thus
showing the claim. uunionsq
A.6 Proof of Theorem 4
To show the claim, by Theorem 2 and 13, and since Pp,q is strongly diverse, it suffices computing the values
of ηθ([Pp,q]H) and γ([Pp,q]H). γ([Pp,q]H) has been computed in Theorem 3, thus it is sufficient computing the
value of ηθ([F ]H). We have that:
ηθ([Pp,q]H) = sup
k>l>0,f∈[Pp,q ]H
kf(k)(1 + θ)
kf(k)(1 + θ) + (lf(l)− lf(k))θ
= sup
k>l>0,(αq,αq+1,...,αp)>0
∑p
d=q αdk
d+1(1 + θ)∑p
d=q αdk
d+1(1 + θ) + (
∑p
d=q αdo
d+1 −∑pd=q αdlkd)θ
= sup
k>l>0,(αq,αq+1,...,αp)>0
∑p
d=q αd
(
kd+1(1 + θ)
)∑p
d=q αd (k
d+1(1 + θ) + (ld+1 − lkd)θ)
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= max
d∈[p]\[q−1]
sup
k>l>0
kd+1(1 + θ)
kd+1(1 + θ) + (ld+1 − lkd)θ
= max
d∈[p]\[q−1]
sup
t>1
td+1(1 + θ)
td+1(1 + θ) + (1− td)θ
= max
d∈[p]\[q−1]
sup
t>1
tp+1(1 + θ)
tp+1(1 + θ) + (tp−d − tp)θ
= sup
t>1
tp+1(1 + θ)
tp+1(1 + θ) + (1− tp)θ . (33)
